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Abstract
This paper proposes and studies a tractable subset of Nash equilibria, belief-
free review-strategy equilibria, in repeated games with private monitoring. The
payoff set of this class of equilibria is characterized in the limit as the discount
factor converges to one for games where players observe statistically indepen-
dent signals. As an application, we develop a simple sufﬁcient condition for the
existence of asymptotically efﬁcient equilibria, and establish a folk theorem for
N-player prisoner’s dilemma. All these results are robust to a perturbation of the
signal distribution, and hence remain true even under almost-independent moni-
toring.
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Consider an oligopolistic market where ﬁrms sell to industrial buyers and interact re-
peatedly. Price and volume of transaction in such a market are typically determined
by bilateral negotiation between a seller and a buyer. Therefore, both price and sales
are private information. This is so-called “secret price-cutting” game of Stigler (1964)
and is a typical example of repeated games with imperfect private monitoring, where
players cannot observe the opponents’ action directly but instead receive noisy private
information. In fact, a ﬁrm’s sales level can be viewed as a noisy information channel
of price of the opponents, as it tends to be low if the opponents (secretly) undercut their
price. Harrington and Skrzypacz (2011) point out that lysine and vitamin markets are
recent examples of secret price-cutting games.1
The theory of repeated games with private monitoring has been an active research
area for recent years, and many positive results have been obtained for the case where
observations are nearly perfect or nearly public: H¨ orner and Olszewski (2006) and
H¨ orner and Olszewski (2009) establish general folk theorems for these environments.
On the other hand, for the case where observations are neither almost-perfect nor
almost-public, attention has been restricted to games that have a simple structure. For
example, assuming that players receive statistically independent signals conditional on
anactionproﬁle, Matsushima(2004)establishesafolktheorem, butonlyfortwo-player
prisoner’s dilemma. Ely, H¨ orner, and Olszewski (2005, hereafter EHO) and Yamamoto
(2007) consider a similar equilibrium construction, but their analyses are still conﬁned
to two-by-two games or to symmetric N-player prisoner’s dilemma. The restriction
to these simple games leaves out many potential applications; for example, none of
these results apply to secret price-cutting games with more than two ﬁrms and with
asymmetric payoff functions.
The present paper extendsthe key idea of Matsushima (2004), EHO, and Yamamoto
(2007) to general N-player games, and shows that there often exist asymptotically ef-
ﬁcient equilibria. For this, we ﬁrst introduce the concept of belief-free review-strategy
equilibria, which captures and generalizes the equilibrium strategies of these papers.
Speciﬁcally, a strategy proﬁle is a belief-free review-strategy equilibrium if (i) the inﬁ-
nite horizon is regarded as a sequence of review phases such that each player chooses
a constant action throughout a review phase, and (ii) at the beginning of each review
phase, a player’s continuation strategy is a best reply regardless of the history up to the
present action, i.e., regardless of the history in the past review phases and regardless
of what pure action the opponents choose in the current phase. While the set of belief-
free review-strategy equilibria is a subset of sequential equilibria, it has the following
1They characterize a stable collusive agreement in secret price-cutting games when players can com-
municate.
2nice properties. First, it follows from condition (i) that if the length of each review
phase is long enough, then players can make (almost) precise inferences about what
the opponents did, using cumulative information within the review phase. This infor-
mation aggregation allows players to punish the opponents efﬁciently, and as a result
we can construct asymptotically efﬁcient equilibria for some games. Also, condition
(ii), which is called strongly belief-free property in this paper, ensures that a player’s
best reply does not depend on her beliefs about the opponents’ history in the past re-
view phases or about what action the opponents choose in the current review phase.
Therefore, we do not need to track evolution of these beliefs when verifying incentive
compatibility of a given strategy proﬁle, which greatly simpliﬁes our analysis.2
An important consequence of the strong belief-free property is that given a review
phase, the set of optimal actions is independent of the history in the past review phase.
This set of optimal actions is called a regime, and given a belief-free review-strategy
equilibrium, let p be a probability distribution of regimes which measures how often
each regime appears in the inﬁnite horizon. Belief-free review-strategy equilibria can
be classiﬁed in terms of a regime distribution p.
Themainresultofthispaperistopreciselycharacterizethesetofbelief-freereview-
strategy equilibrium payoffs in the limit as the discount factor converges to one, assum-
ing that players’ signals are statistically independent conditional on an action proﬁle.
Speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst ﬁnd bounds on the payoff set of belief-free review-strategy equi-
libria given a regime distribution p. The lower bound of player i’s equilibrium payoff is
her minimax payoff when the opponents are restricted to choose actions from a regime
which is randomly picked according to the distribution p. The upper bound of player i’s
equilibrium payoff is her “secured” payoff, that is, the payoff player i can obtain when
the opponents maximize player i’s worst payoffs (payoffs when player i take the worst
action) and players are restricted to choose actions from a regime which is randomly
picked according to the distribution p. Second, we show that these bounds are tight in
the sense that given a p, the limit payoff set of belief-free review-strategy equilibrium
is equal to (a feasible subset of) the product of the intervals between these upper and
lower bounds.
The characterized payoff set is often a subset of the feasible and individually ratio-
nal payoff set, but these two sets coincide in N-player prisoner’s dilemma games, for
which the folk theorem is established with arbitrary noise. Also, as an application of
the main theorem, we develop a simple sufﬁcient condition for the existence of asymp-
totically efﬁcient equilibria. This sufﬁcient condition is often satisﬁed in asymmetric
2Note that the strongly belief-free condition here is similar to but stronger than a requirement for
being belief-free equilibria of EHO. In belief-free equilibria, a player’s best reply is independent of the
history up to the previous periods but can depend on the opponents’ action today. On the other hand, the
strong belief-free condition requires that a best reply be independent of the opponents’ current action.
3secret price-cutting games, so that cartel can be enforced even if a ﬁrm’s price and sales
are private information.
The interpretation of the bounds on the equilibrium payoff set is as follows. By
deﬁnition, in each review phase of a belief-free review-strategy equilibrium, playing
any action within the corresponding regime is optimal. Therefore, choosing the worst
action within the regime in each review phase is optimal in the entire game. Since a
player’s equilibrium payoff cannot exceed the payoff yielded by this “worst” strategy,
we obtain the upper bound stated above. An argument for the lower bound is stan-
dard; a player’s equilibrium payoff must be at least her minimax payoff, as she plays
an optimal action in a belief-free review-strategy equilibrium. Here, the opponents’
actions in determining the minimax value are constrained by regimes, because in each
review phase, actions not in the regime are suboptimal and should not be played on the
equilibrium path. This gives the lower bound of equilibrium payoffs.
To prove that these bounds are tight, we substantially extend the equilibrium con-
struction of Matsushima (2004), EHO, and Yamamoto (2007). In their analysis, atten-
tion is restricted to a simple class of belief-free review-strategy equilibria where each
player independently chooses either “reward the opponent” or “punish the opponent”
in each review phase; their main result is that this “bang-bang” strategy can often ap-
proximate efﬁciency in two-player games. However, if there are more than two players,
this bang-bang strategy does not function well, because players ¡i need to coordinate
their play in order to reward or punish player i.3 To deal with this problem, we borrow
the idea of “informal communication” of H¨ orner and Olszewski (2006) and Yamamoto
(2009), and constructs an equilibrium strategy such that some review phases are re-
garded as “communication stages” where players communicate through a choice of
actions to coordinate a future play.
A main difference from the equilibrium construction of H¨ orner and Olszewski
(2006) and Yamamoto (2009) is that we incorporate additional communication stages
where players try to make a consensus about what happened in a previous communi-
cation stage. The role of this additional communication is roughly as follows. In our
model, private signals are fully noisy, so that players i and j often make different in-
ferences about what player l did in the previous communication stage, when player l
deviated and did not choose a constant action. Then players i and j fail to coordinate
a continuation play, which might yield better payoffs to the deviator l. The additional
communication stages are useful to deter such a deviation; in the additional communi-
cation stage, players i and j communicate to make a consensus about player l’s play so
that they can avoid a miscoordination in a future play. Note that such a problem is not
3Yamamoto (2007) shows that the bang-bang strategy can approximate an efﬁcient outcome in sym-
metric N-player prisoner’s dilemma games, but this result rests on a strong assumption on the payoff
function.
4present in H¨ orner and Olszewski (2006) and Yamamoto (2009), because they assume
almost-perfect monitoring so that players i and j have the same inference about player
l’s action with high probability.
One criticism of the past papers on belief-free review-strategy equilibria is that they
assume conditional independence of signals, which is non-generic in the space of signal
distributions. This paper addresses such a criticism by showing that a payoff vector
in the limit equilibrium payoff set under conditionally-independent monitoring is also
achievable under any nearby monitoring structure. In this sense, belief-free review-
strategy equilibria work well as long as the signal distribution is almost (but not exactly)
conditionally independent.
This robustness result is further extended by a subsequent work by Sugaya (2010).
He modiﬁes the equilibrium construction of this paper, and shows that the main the-
orem remains true for generic monitoring structure, if there are at least four players.
That is, he shows that the limit set of belief-free review-strategy equilibrium payoffs
is characterized by the formula identiﬁed by this paper, for any monitoring structure
that satisﬁes a certain rank condition. His result gives a strong foundation to consid-
eration of belief-free review-strategy equilibria. For example, in prisoner’s dilemma
games with more than three players, a folk theorem is obtained for generic monitoring
structures, and hence patient players have less reason to play other sorts of equilibria,
as far as equilibrium payoffs are concerned.
1.1 Literature Review
There is an extensive literature which studies repeated games with private monitoring.
A pioneering work in this area is Sekiguchi (1997), who constructs a sort of trigger
strategies to approximate an efﬁcient outcome in prisoner’s dilemma when monitoring
approximates perfection. His equilibrium strategies are belief-based in that a player’s
best reply depends on her belief about the opponent’s past history. Bhaskar and Obara
(2002) extend this equilibrium construction to N-player prisoner’s dilemma, and show
that Pareto-efﬁciency can be approximated when observations are near perfect.
Meanwhile, Piccione (2002), Ely and V¨ alim¨ aki (2002), and EHO propose an alter-
native approach to the problem. They consider belief-free strategies, where a player’s
best reply is always independent of the past history and hence a player’s belief about
the past history is irrelevant to the incentive compatibility constraint. They show that
these strategies often approximate Pareto-efﬁcient outcomes in two-player games with
almost-perfect monitoring. Yamamoto (2007) and Yamamoto (2009) extend their anal-
ysis to N-player games. H¨ orner and Olszewski (2006) further extend this approach,
and show that the folk theorem holds for general games with almost-perfect monitor-
ing. The analysis of this paper is close to this belief-free approach, since the concept of
5belief-free review-strategy equilibria is a combination of the idea of belief-free equilib-
ria with review strategies of Radner (1985).
Recently, Fong, Gossner, H¨ orner, and Sannikov (2011) show an efﬁciency result in
arepeatedtwo-playerprisoner’sdilemmawithfully-noisyandfully-privatemonitoring.
They do not assume that players observe statistically independent signals, so that our
folk theorem does not apply to their model. On the other hand, their analysis does not
include ours either, since they do not have a full folk theorem and their equilibrium
strategies cannot achieve some feasible and individually rational payoff vectors. Also,
they assume the minimal informativeness, which requires that there be a signal that has
a sufﬁciently high likelihood ratio to test the opponent’s deviation. Such an assumption
is not imposed in this paper.
For games where observations are almost public, Mailath and Morris (2002) and
Mailath and Morris (2006) show that strict perfect public equilibria with bounded recall
is robust to a perturbation of the monitoring structure. Also, H¨ orner and Olszewski
(2009) show that a folk theorem obtains for games with almost-public monitoring.
Once outside cheap-talk communication is allowed, a folk theorem is restored for
very general environments (Compte (1998), Kandori and Matsushima (1998), Fuden-
berg and Levine (2007), and Obara (2009)). Likewise, a folk theorem holds if players
can acquire perfect information at a cost (Miyagawa, Miyahara, and Sekiguchi (2008)).
For more detailed surveys, see Kandori (2002) and Mailath and Samuelson (2006).
Also, see Lehrer (1990) for the case of no discounting, and Fudenberg and Levine
(1991) for approximate equilibria with discounting.
2 Setup
2.1 The Model
The stage game is fI;(Ai;Wi;gi)i2I;qg; I = f1;2;¢¢¢ ;Ng is the set of players, Ai is
the ﬁnite set of player i’s pure actions, Wi is the ﬁnite set of player i’s private signals,
gi : Ai£Wi ! R is player i’s proﬁt function, and q is the probability distribution of the
signals. Let A = £i2IAi and W = £i2IWi.
In every stage game, players move simultaneously, and player i 2 I chooses an
action ai 2 Ai and then observes a noisy private signal wi 2 Wi. The distribution of the
signal proﬁle w =(w1;¢¢¢ ;wN)2W depends on the action proﬁle a=(a1;¢¢¢ ;aN)2A,
and is denoted by q(¢ja) 2 4W. Given an action ai and a private signal wi, player
i obtains payoff gi(ai;wi); note that in this setup, the payoff is not dependent on the
opponents’ actions and signals, and hence does not provide any extra information about
6the the opponents’ private history.4 Given an action proﬁle a 2 A, player i’s expected
payoff is pi(a) = åw2Wq(wja)gi(ai;wi). For each a 2 A, let p(a) = (pi(a))i2I.
Consider the inﬁnitely repeated game with the discount factor d 2 (0;1). Let
(at
i ;wt





t=1 be player i’s private history up to period t ¸ 1. Let h0
i = / 0, and for each
t ¸ 0, let Ht
i be the set of all ht




i ! 4Ai. Let Si be the set of all strategies of player i, and let S = £i2ISi.
Let wi(s) denote player i’s expected average payoff when players play a strategy proﬁle
s 2 S, that is, wi(s) = (1¡d)E[å
¥




i be player i’s continuation strategy after ht
i. Also, for each si 2 Si,
ht
i 2 Ht
i and ai 2 Ai, let sij(ht
i;ai) be player i’s strategy ˜ si 2 Si such that ˜ si(h0
i ) = ai and
such that for any h1
i 2 H1





i ). In words, sij(ht
i;ai) de-
notes the continuation strategy after history ht
i but the play in the ﬁrst period is replaced
with the pure action ai.
As in Section 5 of EHO, we consider games with conditionally-independent mon-
itoring, where players observe statistically independent signals conditional on actions
played. Formally, we impose the following assumption:
Condition CI. There is qi :A!4Wi for each i such that the following properties hold.




(ii) For each i 2 I and ai 2 Ai, rankQi(ai) = jA¡ij where Qi(ai) is a matrix with rows
(qi(wijai;a¡i))wi2Wi for all a¡i 2 A¡i.
Clause (i) says that given an action proﬁle a, players observe statistically indepen-
dent signals. Clause (ii) is a version of individual full-rank condition of Fudenberg,
Levine, and Maskin (1994); it requires that a player can statistically distinguish the
opponents’ actions. Clause (ii) is satisﬁed for generic monitoring structures, provided
that the set of private signals is sufﬁciently rich so that jWij ¸ jA¡ij for all i.
In addition to (CI), we assume the signal distribution to be full support:
Condition FS. The signal distribution q has full support in that q(wja)>0 for all a2A
and w 2 W.
As Sekiguchi (1997) shows, (FS) assures that for any Nash equilibrium s 2 S, there
is a sequential equilibrium ˜ s 2 S that generates the same outcome distribution as for
4Herewefollowtheexistingworksandassumethatpayoffsareobservable. However, thisassumption
is not necessary; all our results are valid even if payoffs are not observable and directly dependent on the
opponents’ private history.
7s. Therefore, under (FS), the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs is identical with that of
sequential equilibrium payoffs.
Remark 1. (CI) is a simple sufﬁcient condition to obtain our main result, Theorem
1, but it is stronger than necessary and can be replaced with a weaker condition. In
Appendix G, we show that Theorem 1 remains valid even if private signals are corre-
lated through an unobservable common shock as in Matsushima (2004) and Yamamoto
(2007).
2.2 Belief-Free Review-Strategy Equilibrium
This section introduces a notion of belief-free review-strategy equilibria, which cap-
tures and generalizes the idea of the equilibrium construction of Matsushima (2004),
EHO, and Yamamoto (2007). In their equilibrium strategies, the inﬁnite horizon is re-
garded as a sequence of review phases with length T, and players play constant actions
in every review phase, i.e., once player i chooses an action ai in the initial period of
a review phase (say, period nT +1), then she continues to choose the same action ai
up to the end of the review phase (period (n+1)T). At the end of each review phase,
players makes a statistical inference about the opponents’ actions using the information
pooled within the review phase. When T is sufﬁciently large, this statistical test has an
arbitrarily high power so that players can obtain very precise information about what
actions the opponents played.
The present paper considers a slightly broader class of review strategies where each
review phase may have different length.
Deﬁnition 1. Let (tl)¥
l=0 be a sequence of integers satisfying t0 = 0 and tl > tl¡1 for










Intuitively, tl denotes the last period of the lth review phase. For example, the above
deﬁnition asserts that for each period t 2 f2;¢¢¢ ;t1g, a player has to choose the same
action as in period one; thus the collection of the ﬁrst t1 periods is regarded as the ﬁrst
review phase. Likewise, the collection of the next t2¡t1 periods is the second review
phase, and so forth. From the law of large numbers, players can obtain almost perfect
information about the opponents’ action in each review phase, if tl ¡tl¡1 is sufﬁciently
large for all l ¸ 1.
A belief-free review-strategy equilibrium, which we focus on in this paper, is a
subsetofreviewstrategyproﬁles. Foreach iands¡i, letBR(s¡i)denotethesetofplayer
i’s best replies in the inﬁnitely repeated game against s¡i. Also, let suppfs¡i(ht
¡i)g
denote the support of s(ht
¡i); that is, suppfs¡i(ht
¡i)g is the set of actions a¡i played
8with positive probability in period t +1 when players ¡i follow the strategy s¡i and
their past private history is ht
¡i.
Deﬁnition 2. A strategy proﬁle s 2 S is strongly belief-free in the lth review phase if it
is a review strategy proﬁle with some sequence (tl)¥
l=0, and if for all i 2 I, htl¡1 2 Htl¡1,











A strategy proﬁle s is a belief-free review-strategy equilibrium with (tl)¥
l=0 if it is a
review strategy proﬁle with (tl)¥
l=0 and is strongly belief-free in every review phase.
In words, a review strategy proﬁle is strongly belief-free in the lth review phase if
a player’s continuation strategy from the lth review phase is a best reply independently
of the past history and of what constant action the opponents pick in the lth review
phase. By deﬁnition, playing a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the stage game in
every period is a belief-free review-strategy equilibrium where each review phase has
length one. On the other hand, playing a mixed-strategy equilibrium of the stage game
in every period needs not be a belief-free review-strategy equilibrium, as it may not
satisfy (1).
Note that the equilibrium strategies of Matsushima (2004), EHO, and Yamamoto
(2007) are belief-free review-strategy equilibria. Note also that a belief-free review-
strategy equilibrium needs not be a belief-free equilibrium of EHO; the reason is that
in belief-free review-strategy equilibria, the belief-free condition is imposed only at the
beginning of each review phase, while a belief-free equilibrium requires that a player’s
continuation strategy is a best reply independently of the past history in every period.
Conversely, a belief-free equilibrium needs not be a belief-free review-strategy equilib-
rium, as a player’s best reply might depend on the present action of the opponents in a
belief-free equilibrium.
A study of belief-free review-strategy equilibria is motivated by its tractability. By
deﬁnition, in this class of equilibria, a player’s best reply does not depend on her be-
liefs about the opponents’ history in the past review phases or about what action the
opponents choose in the current review phase. Therefore, we do not need to calculate
these beliefs at all when verifying incentive compatibility of a given strategy proﬁle,
which greatly simpliﬁes our analysis. (As argued in the last paragraph, a belief-free
review-strategy equilibrium is not a belief-free equilibrium of EHO; indeed, in a belief-
free review-strategy equilibrium, a player’s belief about what signals the opponents
observed in the current review phase is relevant to her best reply. Under (CI), we can
easily compute this belief, so that it does not cause a serious problem in our analysis.)
93 Characterizing the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set
3.1 Main Theorem
This section presents the main result of this paper: The set of belief-free review-strategy
equilibrium payoffs is characterized in the limit as the discount factor approaches one.
To state the result, the following notation is useful. A non-empty subset A of A is a
regime generated from A if A has a product structure, i.e., A = £i2IAi and Ai µ Ai
for all i. Let J be the set of all regimes generated from A, and for each probability











a(A ) 2 A ; 8A 2 J
)
where coB stands for the convex hull of B. Intuitively, V(p) is the constrained feasible
payoff set, i.e., the set of feasible payoffs when a regime (or a “recommended action
set”) A µ A is randomly picked according to the public randomization p 2 4J, and
players choose actions from this set. Letting pA 2 4J be such that pA(A ) = 1 for
A = A, the set V(pA) corresponds to the feasible payoff set of the repeated game. The
feasible payoff set is full dimensional if dimV(pA) = jIj.
For each i and A , let









Also, for each i and A , let ai(A ) 2 A and ai(A ) 2 A be such that ai
¡i(A ) and
ai
¡i(A ) solve the above problems, that is,
vi(A ) = max
ai2Ai
pi(ai;ai




Note that this deﬁnition does not pose any constraint on the speciﬁcation of ai
i(A ) and
ai
i(A ); these actions can be arbitrarily chosen from the set Ai. Intuitively, vi(A ) is the
minimax payoff for player i when the opponents are restricted to play pure actions from
the recommended set A¡i µ A¡i. In fact, player i cannot earn more than vi(A ) against
ai
¡i(A ). Likewise, vi(A ) is the secured payoff for player i when players are restricted
to choose pure actions from the recommended set A µ A. Indeed, player i’s payoff is
at least vi(A ) against ai
¡i(A ) as long as she chooses an action from Ai.
For each i, let vi be a column vector with the components vi(A ) for all A 2J, that
is, vi =
>(vi(A ))A 2J. Also, let vi =
>(vi(A ))A 2J. Note that, for each distribution
p 2 4J, the product pvi is equal to the weighted average of the minimax payoffs,
åA 2J p(A )vi(A ). Likewise, pvi equals the weighted average of the secured payoffs,
åA 2J p(A )vi(A ).
10The stage games are classiﬁed into four groups in the following way. Note that this
classiﬁcation depends only on the (expected) payoff function of the stage game.
² (positivecase)Forsome p24J, thesetV(p)
T
£i2I[pvi; pvi]isN-dimensional.
² (empty case) For any p 2 4J, the set V(p)
T
£i2I[pvi; pvi] is empty.
² (negative case) The set V(p)
T
£i2I[pvi; pvi] is a singleton or empty for all p 2
4J, and there is p 2 4J such that the intersection ofV(p) and £i2I[pvi; pvi]
is a singleton.
² (abnormal case) The set V(p)
T
£i2I[pvi; pvi] is not N-dimensional for all p 2
4J, and there is p 2 4J such that the set V(p)
T
£i2I[pvi; pvi] is neither
empty nor a singleton.
Given a stage game and given a d 2 (0;1), let E(d) be the set of belief-free review-
strategy equilibrium payoffs. That is, for any payoff vector v 2 E(d), there is a belief-
free review-strategy equilibrium with some sequence (tl)¥
l=0 and with payoff v. The
following is the main result of the paper, which characterizes the limit equilibrium
payoff set for the positive, empty, and negative cases.







in the positive case; E(d) = / 0 for every d 2 (0;1) in the empty case; and limd!1E(d)
equals the convex hull of the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium payoffs of the stage
game in the negative case.
To interpret the statement of this theorem, we classify belief-free review-strategy
equilibria in terms of a regime distribution p, where given a belief-free review-strategy
equilibrium, p is a parameter which measures how often each regime appears in the
inﬁnite horizon. In the positive case, the theorem asserts that for a given p, the limit
equilibrium payoff set equals (the feasible subset of) the product set £i2I[pvi; pvi].
That is, the lower bound of the equilibrium payoffs is equal to the minimax payoff
pvi while the upper bound is the secured payoff pvi. Yamamoto (2009) shows that the
limit set of belief-free equilibrium payoffs is computed by a formula similar to (2); but
note that players are allowed to choose mixed actions when determining the upper and
lower bounds of the payoff set in Yamamoto (2009), while here players are constrained
to play pure actions when calculating vi and vi. This difference comes from the fact
that belief-free review-strategy equilibria impose the strongly belief-free condition (1),
11while belief-free equilibria do not. Since (1) requires player i’s continuation strategy to
be optimal after mixture by players ¡i, her equilibrium payoff is at least the minimax
payoff when players are restricted to pure actions. A similar argument applies to the
upper bound.
AsYamamoto(2009)argues, ifthereare onlytwoplayers, then theset £i2I[pvi;pvi]







This formula is exactly the same as that of Proposition 10 of EHO for two-by-two
games, which means that Theorem 1 subsumes their result as a special case. Note also
thatourTheorem1encompassesTheorems1and2ofMatsushima(2004)andTheorem
1 of Yamamoto (2007) as well; See Section 4 for more discussions. (Theorem 2 of
Matsushima (2004) and Theorem 1 of Yamamoto (2007) allow that players’ signals
are correlated through a common shock. Our Theorem 1 extends to such a setting, as
argued in Remark 1 and formally proved in Appendix G.)
As noted, a sufﬁcient condition for the existence of belief-free review-strategy equi-
libria is that the stage game has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium; indeed, playing a
pure-strategyNashequilibriumofthestagegameineveryperiodisabelief-freereview-
strategy equilibrium where each review phase has length one. On the other hand, if
the stage game has only a mixed-strategy equilibrium, then belief-free review-strategy
equilibria need not exist. For example, consider the following game:
H T
H 1, ¡2 ¡1, 1
T ¡2, 1 1, ¡1
Player 1 chooses a row and player 2 chooses a column. Note that this stage game has
no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. In this game, it is easy to check that vi(A ) = 1
for all i and A so that pvi = 1 for all i and p. Since any feasible payoff vector is
Pareto-dominated by (pv1;pv2) = (1;1), the set V(p)
T
£i2I[pvi; pvi] is empty for all
p. Therefore, the game is classiﬁed to the empty case, and from Theorem 1, belief-free
review-strategy equilibria do not exist for any discount factor d.
Theorem 1 is a corollary of the next two propositions. Note that the statement of
Proposition 1 is stronger than needed, as it does not assume (CI) or (FS). The proof of
Proposition 1 is similar to that of Proposition 1 of Yamamoto (2009), and is provided
in Appendix A for completeness. The proof of Proposition 2 is found in the following
subsections.
Proposition 1. In the positive case, E(d) is a subset of the right-hand side of (2) for
any d 2 (0;1). In the empty case, E(d) = / 0. In the negative case, limd!1E(d) is equal
to the convex hull of the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium payoffs of the stage game.
12Proposition2. Supposethat(CI)and(FS)hold. Then, inthepositivecase, limd!1E(d)
includes the right-hand side of (2).
Theorem 1 gives a precise characterization of the limit equilibrium payoffs for the
positive, empty, and negative cases, but it does not consider the abnormal case. In
Appendix F, we show that for the abnormal case with generic payoff functions, the
equilibrium payoff set is either empty or the convex hull of the set of pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium payoffs of the stage game.
3.2 Proof of Proposition 2 with Two Players
3.2.1 Overview
To prove the proposition, it sufﬁces to show that for any payoff vector v in the right-
hand side of (2) and for a sufﬁciently large discount factor d, there is a belief-free
review-strategy equilibrium with payoff v. In this subsection, we explicitly construct
such an equilibrium for two-player games. The analysis for three-or-more player games
is more complex and will be presented in the next subsection.
Our equilibrium construction is based on EHO’s for two-by-two games, so it will be
helpful to explain how EHO’s equilibrium strategies look like. The inﬁnitely repeated
game is regarded as a sequence of T-period review phases, and in each review phase, a
player is either in good state G or in bad state B. When player ¡i is in good state G,
she chooses the action ai
¡i(A ) for some A throughout the review phase to “reward”
player i. (Recall that player i obtains at least the “secured” payoff vA
i against ai
¡i(A )
if she chooses an action from the set Ai.) On the other hand, when player ¡i is in bad
state B, she chooses the action ai
¡i(A ) for some A throughout the review phase to
“punish” player i. (Again, recall that player i’s payoff against ai
¡i(A ) is at most vA
i .)
After a T-period play, each player makes a statistical inference about the opponent’s
play using the private signals pooled within the review phase, and then decides which
state to go to (either state G or B) for the next review phase. This transition rule between
states G and B is judiciously chosen so that in every review phase, player i is indifferent
between being in good state (i.e., playing ai
¡i(A ) for T periods) and being in bad
state (i.e., playing ai
¡i(A ) for T periods), and is not willing to do other sorts of play.
Therefore players’ incentive compatibility is satisﬁed.
A difference between EHO’s equilibrium and ours is a construction of statistical
tests about actions. In EHO, the analysis is limited to two-by-two games, so that each
player needs to distinguish only two actions of the opponent. For this, it is sufﬁcient to
consider a simple statistical test such that player ¡i counts the number of observations
of a particular signal w¡i during a T-period play.
13On the other hand, here we consider general two-player games, so that a player may
have more than two possible actions. In such a case, a player’s statistical inference must
be based on two or more signals,5 which often complicates the veriﬁcation of a player’s
incentive compatibility. The contribution of this paper is to ﬁnd an elaborate method of
statistical inference which makes the veriﬁcation of incentive compatibility constraints
simple.
It may be noteworthy that (CI) plays an important role here. Under (CI), a player’s
signal has no information about the opponent’s signal and hence no information about
whether she is likely to pass the opponent’s statistical test. Therefore, a player has no
incentive to play a history-dependent strategy in a review phase, so that when verify-
ing the incentive compatibility constraint of a given strategy proﬁle, we can restrict
attention to deviations to history-independent strategies.
3.2.2 Random Events
Here we introduce a notion of random events, which is used for statistical tests in
our equilibrium construction. A random event yi is deﬁned as a function from Ai £






player i’s action and signal in period t and zt
i is randomly chosen by player i at the end
of period t according to the uniform distribution on [0;1]. Put differently, yi(at
i;wt
i)
denotes the probability that the random event yi is counted in period t conditional on
(at
i;wt
i). A player may count multiple random events in a given period; for example,
given an outcome (at
i;wt
i;zt




i and if ˜ yi(at
i;wt
i) ¸ zt
i. With an abuse of notation, let ht
i denote player













For each yi :Ai£Wi ![0;1], let P(yija) be the probability that the random event yi
is counted given an action proﬁle a 2 A, that is, P(yija) = åw2Wq(wja)yi(ai;wi). Let
Ji be the set of non-empty subsets of Ai. For each i 2 I and A¡i 2 J¡i, let yi(A¡i)
be as in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Suppose that (CI) holds. Then, for some q1 and q2 satisfying 0 < q1 < q2 <
1, there is a random event yi(A¡i) : Ai£Wi ! [0;1] for all i and A¡i 2 J¡i such that
for all a 2 A,
P(yi(A¡i)ja) =
(
q2 if a¡i 2 A¡i
q1 otherwise
: (3)
5To see this, suppose that player ¡i observes a signal w¡i with 0:8 against ai, with 0:5 against a0
i,
and with 0:2 against a00
i . If player ¡i tries to infer player i’s action only from w¡i, she cannot distinguish
whether player i plays a0
i or mixes ai and a00
i with ﬁfty-ﬁfty.
14Proof. Analogous to Lemma 1 of Yamamoto (2007). Q.E.D.
The condition (3) implies that a player can statistically distinguish the opponent’s
action using these random events. For example, the random event yi(fa¡ig) is counted
with high probability q2 if and only if player ¡i chooses the action a¡i. Hence, player
i can conjecture that the action a¡i is played if yi(fa¡ig) is counted many times within
a review phase.
Let F(t;T;r) denote the probability that yi(fa¡ig) is counted exactly r times out
of T periods when player ¡i chooses some ˜ a¡i , a¡i in the ﬁrst t periods and then a¡i














TF(0;T ¡1;ZT) = ¥: (6)
3.2.3 Equilibrium Construction with Two Players
Let v = (v1;v2) be a payoff vector in the interior of the right-hand side of (2). In
what follows, we construct a belief-free review-strategy equilibrium with payoff v for






As Yamamoto (2009) shows, given such a v, there is p 2 4J such that v is an
element of the interior of the setV(p)\£i2I[pvi; pvi]. Assume that players can observe
a public signal y from the set J according to the distribution p in every period. This
assumption greatly simpliﬁes the equilibrium construction, and does not cause loss of
generality; indeed, such a public randomization device is dispensable, as EHO argue in
the online appendix.















l=1 is an ordering of
actions in terms of payoffs against aA




¡i ! f0;1g be an indicator function such that 1
B;A ;l
i (hT
¡i) = 1 if and only if
the random event y¡i(fa
B;A ;˜ l
i jl · ˜ l · jAijg) is counted more than ZT times within a
T-period history hT
¡i.
To see how this indicator function works, ﬁx l 2 f1;¢¢¢ ;jAijg, and consider the
random event y¡i(fa
B;A ;˜ l
i jl · ˜ l · jAijg). From (3), this random event is counted with
15high probability q2 if player i chooses an action ai from the set fa
B;A ;˜ l
i jl · ˜ l · jAijg
against aA
¡i, and is counted with low probability q1 if player i chooses other actions.




takes 1 in the former case, while it almost surely takes 0 in the latter case. This property
implies that player ¡i can test whether player i took an action from the set fa
B;A ;˜ l
i jl ·
˜ l · jAijg or not, by referring to the indicator function 1
B;A ;l





l=1, player ¡i can obtain almost perfect information about
player i’s action in a T-period interval.











¡i) for each l ¸ 2. Then, for each A and l 2
f1;¢¢¢ ;jAijg, let 1
G;A ;l
i :HT




1 if and only if the random event y¡i(fa
G;A ;˜ l
i jl · ˜ l · jAijg) is counted more than ZT
times during T periods, according to a T-period history hT
¡i. Again, using this indicator
function 1
G;A ;l
i , player ¡i can test whether player i chooses her action from the set
fa
G;A ;˜ l
i jl · ˜ l · jAijg.
Leth besuchthat0<h < pvi¡vi foralli, andletC besuchthatC>maxai2Aipi(ai;aA
¡i)¡
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(7)
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(8)



























It follows from (4) and (5) that for all i,
lim
T!¥
wi = pvi < pvi¡h = lim
T!¥
wi: (9)
16In what follows, we show that any interior point v¤ of the set £i2I[pvi;pvi¡h] can
be achieved by belief-free review-strategy equilibria for sufﬁciently large T and d. This
completes the proof, as pvi < vi < pvi¡h.
In our equilibrium strategies, players play a strategy proﬁle in which the inﬁnite
horizon is regarded as a sequence of review phases with length T. Speciﬁcally, for each
i, player ¡i’s strategy is described by the following automaton with initial state v¤
i .
State wi 2 [wi;wi] : Go to phase B with probability a¡i, and go to phase G with
probability 1¡a¡i where a¡i solves wi = a¡iwi+(1¡a¡i)wi.
Phase B : Play the action aA
¡i for T periods, where A is the outcome of the public
randomization p in the initial period of the phase (say, period nT +1). After that, go to
























Phase G : Play the action aA
¡i for T periods, where A is the outcome of the public
randomization p in the initial period of the phase (say, period nT +1). After that, go to




























The idea of this automaton is as follows. In each review phase, player ¡i is either
in state G or in state B. Player ¡i in state G chooses aA
¡i to reward the opponent,
while in state B, she chooses aA





i determine the transition probability between states G and B at the end of each
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continuation payoffs of player i.












˜ l · jAijg) (or the random event y¡i(fa
G;A ;˜ l
i jl · ˜ l · jAijg)) more than ZT times during





i are carefully chosen so that player i is indifferent among
17all constant actions ai 2 A . To see this, suppose that player ¡i is in state B so that
she chooses aA




¡i yields more stage-game payoffs to player i than playing a
B;A ;l
i . However, play-
ing a
B;A ;l¡1
i decreases the expected value of the reward function U
B;A
i , as player ¡i
counts the event y¡i(fa
B;A ;˜ l
i jl · ˜ l · jAijg) less likely; thus player i receives the bonus
l
B;A ;l
i less likely if she chooses a
B;A ;l¡1
i . The value l
B;A ;l
i is chosen to offset these
two effects, and as a consequence, player i is indifferent between playing a
B;A ;l¡1
i for
T periods and a
B;A ;l
i for T periods. In this way, we can make player i indifferent over
all constant actions ai 2 Ai.
In addition, as in Matsushima (2004), the threshold value ZT is carefully chosen so
that mixing two or more actions in a T-period review phase is suboptimal. Therefore,
the above automaton constitutes a belief-free review-strategy equilibrium with payoff
v¤ for sufﬁciently large T and d, as desired. The formal proof is found in Appendix B.
3.3 Proof of Proposition 2 with Three or More Players
3.3.1 Notation and Overview
If there are more than two players, the equilibrium construction presented in Section
3.2 does not work. The reason is as follows. In the equilibrium strategies of Section
3.2, player ¡i transits between states B and G to punish or reward player i, and provides
appropriate incentives. However, if there are more than two players, players ¡i have to
coordinate their play in order to punish or reward player i. This poses a new difﬁculty,
as players do not share any common information under private monitoring, and it is not
obvious whether players ¡i can coordinate their play to reward or punish player i.
Taking this problem into account, we will provide an alternative equilibrium con-
struction for games with three or more players. The key is to extend the idea of “co-
ordination through informal communication” of H¨ orner and Olszewski (2006) and Ya-
mamoto (2009) to our setting.
Throughout the proof, let “player i¡1” refer to player i¡1 for each i 2 f2;¢¢¢ ;Ng,
and to player N for i = 1. Likewise, let “player i+1” refer to player i+1 for each
i 2 f1;¢¢¢ ;N ¡1g, and to player 1 for i = N. Let Xi = fG;Bg, and X = £i2IXi. As
explained later, Xi will be interpreted as player i’s message space; G is called good
message, and B is bad message. For each i, pick two elements of Ai arbitrarily, and call
each of them aG
i and aB
i , respectively.
In the equilibrium construction below, the inﬁnite repeated game is regarded as a
sequence of block games with length Tb. In each block game, a player is either in
state G or in state B. Player i with state G plays a Tb-period repeated game strategy
sG
i during a block game, while player i with state B plays a strategy sB
i . These block-
18game strategies sG
i and sB
i are chosen in such a way that player i’s block-game payoff
is high if player i¡1 is in state G, and is low if player i¡1 is in state B. At the end
of each block game, a player transits over two states G and B. Here players’ transition
rule is carefully chosen so that (i) in each block game, the strategies sG
i and sB
i are
best replies for player i, regardless of players ¡i’s current state; (ii) for each j , i¡1,
player j’s current state (either G or B) is irrelevant to player i’s continuation payoff;
and (iii) player i’s continuation payoff is high if player (i¡1)’s current state is G and
it is low if player (i¡1)’s current state is B. From (i), the constructed strategy proﬁle
is an equilibrium. Also, (ii) and (iii) imply that player i¡1 can solely control player i’s
continuation payoff through a choice of states; that is, players i¡1 needs not coordinate
a choice of states with other players to reward or punish player i. Speciﬁcally, player
i¡1 chooses state G if she wants to reward player i, and chooses state B if she wants to
punish.
So far the idea is very similar to H¨ orner and Olszewski (2006) and in particular
Yamamoto (2009). However, the block game considered here has a more complex
structure than theirs. A block game with length Tb is divided into rounds, and each
round is further divided into review phases. Speciﬁcally, each block game consists of
a signaling round, a conﬁrmation round, K pairs of a main round and a supplemental












Figure 1: Block Game
Signaling, conﬁrmation, supplemental, and report rounds are regarded as “com-
munication stages,” where players disclose their private information via a choice of
actions. Unlike cheap-talk games, actions in these communication stages are payoff-
relevant. However, the length of the communication stages is much shorter than that
of the main rounds, so that payoffs in the communication stages are almost negligible.
19The following is a brief explanation of the role of each round.
Signaling Round : This round is used for communication, and each player re-
veals whether she is in state G or in state B. Speciﬁcally, player i’s message space
is Xi = fG;Bg, and we say that player i sends message xi 2 Xi if she chooses action a
xi
i
constantly in the signaling round. The length of the signaling round is of order T, and
hence for sufﬁciently large T, communication is almost perfect; that is, each player can
receive her opponents’ messages correctly with very high probability.
Conﬁrmation Round : This round is also used for communication, and players try
to make sure what happened in the signaling round. Speciﬁcally, each player i reports
(i) what she did and (ii) what her neighbors (players i¡1 and i+1) did in the signaling
round. The length of the conﬁrmation round is of order T, so that for sufﬁciently large
T, the communication here is almost perfect.
Main Rounds and Supplemental Rounds : Players’ play in the main rounds is de-
pendent on communication in the conﬁrmation round. Roughly, if players agreed in the
conﬁrmation round that the message proﬁle in the signaling round was x = (xi)i2I 2 X,
then in the main rounds, they play actions such that (i) for each i with xi¡1 = G, player
i’s payoff is high and (ii) for each i with xi¡1 = B, player i’s payoff is low. This ensures
that player i’s expected block-game payoff is high if player (i¡1)’s current state is G,
and is low if player (i¡1)’s state is B.
In each supplemental round, every player reports whether or not her neighbors
deviated in the previous main round. That is, in the kth supplemental round (here
k 2 f1;¢¢¢ ;Kg), each player i reports whether or not player i¡1 or player i+1 devi-
ated in the kth main round. If both players j¡1 and j+1 report in the kth supplemental
round that player j has deviated, then players regard player j as a deviator and change
their continuation play accordingly.
Report Round : This round is also used for communication, and each player reports
her private history in the conﬁrmation and supplemental rounds. The information re-
vealed in the report round is utilized to determine the transition probability between
states G and B for the next block game.
As described above, in the conﬁrmation and supplemental rounds, players commu-
nicate to make a consensus about what happened in previous rounds. This is a new
feature compared to Yamamoto (2009); in the block game of Yamamoto (2009) there
is no conﬁrmation round or supplemental round.
Communicating in the conﬁrmation round plays an important role to deter devia-
tions in the signaling round. In the signaling round, players are asked to send message
20G or B on the equilibrium path, and if they take any other sort of play, it must be pun-
ished. However, under private monitoring, players may have different inferences about
what actions were played in the signaling round, and may fail to coordinate to punish a
deviator. For example, suppose that player i deviated in the signaling round by playing
aG
i almost all the time but aB
i in a few periods. Since this play is almost the same as
sending message G, it is hard to distinguish these two, and as a result, it is often the
case that some of the opponents notice player i’s deviation while others do not. To
resolve such a conﬂict, we ask players to communicate again in the conﬁrmation round
to make a consensus about what happened in the signaling round. This enables players
to coordinate their continuation play, and ensures that deviating in the signaling round
does not deliver big gains to the deviator.
Likewise, communicating in the supplemental rounds is important for punishing a
player who deviated in the main rounds. As in the signaling round, often times players
have different inferences about what actions were played in the kth main round, which
may cause a coordination failure in later periods. To avoid such a miscoordination,
players communicate in the kth supplemental round and to make a consensus about
what happened in the kth main round.
The conﬁrmation and supplemental rounds are dispensable in Yamamoto (2009),
because almost-perfect monitoring is assumed there. Under almost-perfect monitoring,
players’ inferences about past play within a block game are (almost) common informa-
tion, so that players can almost surely coordinate their play without communication.
More discussions on the conﬁrmation and supplemental rounds are given in Section
3.3.6.
3.3.2 Actions, Regimes, and Payoffs
Let v = (v1;¢¢¢ ;vN) be an interior point of the right-hand side of (2). We will construct
a belief-free review-strategy equilibrium with payoff v for sufﬁciently large d.
The following notation is used throughout the proof. Let p 2 4J be such that v
is included in the interior of V(p)\£i2I[pvi; pvi]. Let (wi)i2I and (wi)i2I be such that
wi <vi <wi for all i2I, and such that the hyper-rectangle £i2I[wi; wi]is included in the
interior of V(p)\£i2I[pvi; pvi]. Then, as Yamamoto (2009) shows, there is a natural
number ˜ K, a sequence (A 1;¢¢¢ ;A
˜ K) of regimes, and 2N sequences (ax;1;¢¢¢ ;ax; ˜ K)x2X












vi(A k); 8i 2 I (10)








< wi if xi¡1 = B
> wi if xi¡1 = G
; 8i 2 I: (12)
To interpret (10), recall that vi(A ) is player i’s minimax payoff when players ¡i are
restricted to play pure actions from A¡i. The ﬁrst inequality of (10) implies that player
i’s time-average minimax payoff for ˜ K periods is less than wi given the regime se-
quence (A 1;¢¢¢ ;A
˜ K). Likewise, the last inequality of (10) says that player i’s time-
average reward payoff is greater than wi. (11) says that for each x, the action sequence
(ax;1;¢¢¢ ;ax; ˜ K) is consistent with the regime sequence (A 1;¢¢¢ ;A
˜ K), in the sense that
each component of the action sequence is an element of the corresponding regime. (12)
implies that player i’s time-average payoff of the sequence (ax;1;¢¢¢ ;ax; ˜ K) is high if
xi¡1 = G and low if xi¡1 = B. Figure 2 shows how to pick wi, wi, and (ax;1;¢¢¢ ;ax; ˜ K)























Given a natural number K, let (A 1;¢¢¢ ;A K) be a cyclic sequence of (A 1;¢¢¢ ;A
˜ K)
with length K, that is, A k+n ˜ K =A k for all k 2f1;¢¢¢ ; ˜ Kg and n¸0. Likewise, for each
x 2 X, let (ax;1;¢¢¢ ;ax;K) be a cyclic sequence of (ax;1;¢¢¢ ;ax; ˜ K).
3.3.3 Blocks and Rounds
Given integers T and K, let Tb = NT +6NT +K2T +2KNT +2N2(3+K)T. In what
follows, the inﬁnite periods are regarded as a series of block games with length Tb.
Integers T and K are to be speciﬁed.
22Each block game is further divided into several rounds. The collection of the ﬁrst
NT periods of a block game is called a signaling round, and the collection of the next
6NT periods is a conﬁrmation round. Then, a pair of a main round (KT periods) and a
supplemental round (2NT periods) appears K times, and the collection of the remaining
2N2(3+K)T periods is a report round. See Figure 1 in Section 3.3.1.
Theconﬁrmation, supplemental, andreportroundsareregardedasaseriesofreview
phases with length T. The signaling and main rounds themselves are regarded as review
phases. Let (tl)¥
l=0 be the sequence of integers such that t0 = 0 and tl denotes the last
period of the lth review phase for each l ¸ 1. For example, t1 = NT (because the ﬁrst
review phase of the inﬁnite horizon game is the signaling round of the ﬁrst block game,
which consists of NT periods) and t2 = NT +T, (because the second review phase of
the inﬁnite horizon game is the ﬁrst review phase of the conﬁrmation round, which
consists of T periods).
The following is a detailed description of each round.
Signaling Round : This round is used for communication, and each player i reveals
her current state (G or B) by choosing message xi from Xi = fG;Bg. We say that player
i sends message xi 2Xi if she chooses the action a
xi
i constantly (i.e., playing a
xi
i in every
period of the signaling round).
Conﬁrmation Round : In this round, each player i reports what she did and what





i;i+1) from the message space M0
i ´ fG;B;Eg3, where the
component m0
i;j denotes player i’s inference about what player j did. Roughly speaking,
player i chooses m0
i;j = G if she believes that player j sent message G, m0
i;j = B if she
believes that player j sent message B, and m0
i;j =E if she is uncertain about what player
j did. Let M0 denote the set of all message proﬁles, that is, M0 ´ £i2IM0
i .
In the conﬁrmation round, players send their messages sequentially, i.e., player 1
sends her message m0
1 ﬁrst, then does player 2, and so forth. Each player spends 2T
periods sending each component of her message; that is, player i sends m0
i;j using her
actions in the (6(i¡1)+2(j¡i+2)¡1)st review phase and the (6(i¡1)+2(j¡i+
2))nd review phase of the conﬁrmation round. Player i sends m0
i;j = G by choosing
aG
i constantly in both of these phases; she sends m0
i;j = B by choosing aB
i constantly
in both of these phase; and she sends m0
i;j = E by choosing aG
i constantly in the ﬁrst
review phase and then aB
i constantly in the second review phase.
Givenamessageproﬁlem0 2M0, wesaythatxi =Gisconﬁrmedbyplayersifeither
(i) (m0
i¡1;i;m0
i+1;i) = (G;G), (ii) (m0
i¡1;i;m0
i+1;i) = (G;E) or (m0
i¡1;i;m0




i;i) = (G;B;G) or (m0
i¡1;i;m0
i+1;i;m0
i;i) = (B;G;G). That is, players
conﬁrm that player i’s message in the signaling round was G if either (i) both players
23i¡1 and i+1 claim that player i’s message was G; (ii) one of these two players claims
thatplayeri’smessagewasGandtheotherplayersaysthatsheisuncertainaboutplayer
i’s message; or (iii) one of these players claims that player i’s message was G, the other
player claims that player i’s message was B, and player i claims that her message was
G. On the other hand, given a m0 2 M0, xi = B is conﬁrmed by players if xi = G is not
conﬁrmed. Note that player i’s report about her own play, m0
i;i, is relevant only when
players i¡1 and i+1 have different inferences about player i’s play (i.e., only when
(m0
i¡1;i;m0
i+1;i) = (G;B) or (m0
i¡1;i;m0
i+1;i) = (B;G)). Otherwise, player i’s report m0
i;i
is ignored, and xi = B or xi = G is conﬁrmed contingently on the reports from players
i¡1 and i+1 only. Given a message proﬁle m0, x =(xi)i2I 2X is conﬁrmed by players
if each component of x is conﬁrmed. Let M0(x) denote the set of all m0 2 M0 such that
x is conﬁrmed.
MainRounds: Players’behaviorinthemainroundsiscontingentonwhathappened
in the conﬁrmation round. Roughly, if x 2 X is conﬁrmed in the conﬁrmation round,
then players follow the sequence (ax;1;¢¢¢ ;ax;K) of action proﬁles in the main rounds,
i.e., the action proﬁle ax;k is played in the kth main round for each k 2 f1;¢¢¢ ;Kg.
However, if someone unilaterally deviates from this prescribed rule and if the deviation
is reported in the subsequent supplemental round, then they switch their play. Details
are stated later.
Supplemental Rounds : The kth supplemental round is used for communication, and
each player reports whether or not her neighbors deviated from the prescribed action
proﬁle ax;k in the kth main round. Speciﬁcally, in the kth supplemental round, player i
chooses a message mk
i from the message space Mk
i = fi¡1;i+1;0g. Roughly, player
i chooses mk
i = i¡1 if she believes that player i¡1 deviated from ax;k in the kth main
round, mk
i = i+1 if she believes that player i+1 deviated, and mk
i = 0 otherwise. Let
Mk be the set of all message proﬁles mk = (mk
1;¢¢¢ ;mk
N).
Foreachk2f1;¢¢¢ ;Kgandi2I, letMk(i)bethesetofallmessageproﬁlesmk 2Mk
such that mk
i¡1 = mk
i+1 = i and such that for each j 2 f1;¢¢¢ ;i¡1g, either mk
j¡1 , j or
mk
j+1 , j. In words, Mk(i) is the set of message proﬁles mk such that both players i¡1
and i+1 report player i’s deviation, and for each j 2 f1;¢¢¢ ;i¡1g, player j’s deviation
is not reported by player j¡1 or player j+1. Let Mk(0) be the set of all mk 2 Mk such
that mk < Mk(i) for all i 2 I.
As in the conﬁrmation round, players send their messages sequentially in each sup-
plemental round. Speciﬁcally, player i sends a message mk
i 2 Mk
i using her actions in
the (2i¡1)st and 2ith review phases of the kth supplemental round. Player i sends
mk
i = i¡1 by choosing aG
i constantly in both of these phases; she sends mk
i = i+1 by
choosing aB
i constantly in both of these phases; and she sends mk
i = 0 by choosing aG
i
24constantly in the ﬁrst review phase and then aB
i constantly in the second review phase.
Report Round : This round is also regarded as a communication stage, and each
player reports what message proﬁles were sent in the conﬁrmation round and the sup-
plemental rounds. Thus the message space for player i is M0£M1£¢¢¢£MK. As in
the conﬁrmation and supplemental rounds, players report their messages sequentially;
player 1 sends her message in the ﬁrst 2N(3+K) review phases of the report round,
then does player 2, and so forth. How to send a message is analogous to that in the
conﬁrmation and supplemental rounds.
Observe that the ratio of the total length of the main rounds to that of the block
game is K2T
Tb , which approaches one as K ! ¥. Therefore, for sufﬁciently large K, a
player’s average payoff in the block game is approximated by that in the main rounds.
In other words, payoffs during the communication stages are almost negligible.
3.3.4 Block Strategies under Perfect Monitoring
Let S
Tb
i be the set of player i’s strategies in the Tb-period block game. Also, let S
Tb
i be




i such that player i plays a constant action (i.e., she does
notmixtwoormoreactions)ineachreviewphaseandsuchthatforeach k2f1;¢¢¢ ;Kg,
player i chooses an action from the set A k
i in the kth main round. Intuitively, A k
i is the
set of “recommended actions” for the kth main round, and S
Tb
i is the set of strategies
which follow this recommendation; so we will call it the set of recommended strategies.
Given a strategy proﬁle sTb 2 STb, let wP
i (sTb) denote player i’s average payoff in the
block game with perfect monitoring where payoffs in the periods other than the main
rounds are replaced with zero. Note that wP
i (sTb) approximates the average payoff in
the block game with perfect monitoring, as payoffs in the communication stages are
almost negligible.




player i with state B plays a “bad” block strategy sB
i 2 S
Tb
i . In this section, we specify
these two block strategies under perfect monitoring, and then speciﬁes the parameter K,
which determines the number of main and supplemental rounds within a block game.
As mentioned earlier, these strategies will be constructed in such a way that player i’s
payoff is high if player (i¡1)’s current state is G (so that she plays sG
i ), and it is low if









i is represented by a sequence of action proﬁles, since



















i) denotes player i’s inference on player j’s message xj in the signaling
round, given her private history ht
i: Note that ˆ xj(ht
i) = G if and only if player j sent
message G, and ˆ xj(ht
i) = B if and only if player j sent message B. Otherwise ˆ xj(ht
i) =
E, which means that the history is erroneous. Given a history ht
i 2 Ht
i, let ˆ x(ht
i) =
(xj(ht
i))j2I, that is, ˆ x(ht
i) is player i’s inference on the message proﬁle in the signaling
round.
Likewise, given a history ht
i, let ˆ m0
j(ht







player i’s inference on player j’s message m0
j in the conﬁrmation round. Speciﬁcally,
for each l = j¡1; j; j+1, let ˆ m0
j;l(ht
i) = G if player j sent m0
j;l = G; ˆ m0
j;l(ht
i) = B if
player j sent m0
j;l = B; and ˆ m0
j;l(ht
i) = E otherwise. Let ˆ m0(ht
i) denote player i’s infer-
ence on the message proﬁle in the conﬁrmation round, that is, ˆ m0(ht
i) = ( ˆ m0
j(ht
i))j2I.
Also, for each k and ht
i, let ˆ mk
j(ht
i) denote player i’s inference on player j’s message
mk
j in the kth supplemental round. Speciﬁcally, let ˆ mk
j(ht
i) = j ¡1 if player j sent
mk
j = j¡1; ˆ mk
j(ht
i) = j+1 if player j sent mk
j = j+1; and ˆ mk
j(ht
i) = 0 otherwise. Let
ˆ mk(ht
i) denote player i’s inference on the message proﬁle in the kth supplemental round,
that is, ˆ mk(ht
i) = ( ˆ mk
j(ht
i))j2I.
Under perfect monitoring, the block strategies sG
i and sB
i are deﬁned as follows.
In the signaling round, sG
i sends message G and sB
i sends message B. In the conﬁr-
mation round and in the report round, both sG
i and sB
i tell the truth; i.e., both strate-
gies send the message m0
i = ˆ x(ht
i) in the conﬁrmation round and send the message
( ˆ m0(ht
i);¢¢¢ ; ˆ mK(ht
i)) in the report round. (See the previous section for how to send
these messages.) Both strategies play the action aG
i in periods where player j , i sends
a message.
Players’ play in the main rounds are contingent on the outcome in the past com-
munication; that is, for each k 2 f1;¢¢¢ ;Kg, player i’s action in the kth main round
is dependent on ( ˆ m0(ht
i);¢¢¢ ; ˆ mk¡1(ht
i)). If ( ˆ m0(ht
i);¢¢¢ ; ˆ mk¡1(ht
i)) is an element of
M0(x)£M1(0)£¢¢¢£Mk¡1(0) for some x 2 X, then both strategies say to play the
action a
x;k
i constantly in the kth main round. If ( ˆ m0(ht
i);¢¢¢ ; ˆ m
˜ k(ht
i)) is an element of
M0(x)£M1(0)£¢¢¢£M
˜ k¡1(0)£M
˜ k(j) for some j 2 I, ˜ k 2 f1;¢¢¢ ;k¡1g, and x 2 X
satisfying xj¡1 = B, then both strategies say to play the action a
j
i(A k) constantly in the
kth main round. Likewise, if ( ˆ m0(ht
i);¢¢¢ ; ˆ m
˜ k(ht
i)) is an element of M0(x)£M1(0)£
¢¢¢£M
˜ k¡1(0)£M
˜ k(j) for some j 2I, ˜ k2f1;¢¢¢ ;k¡1g, and x2X satisfying xj¡1 =G,
then both strategies say to play the action a
j
i(A k) constantly in the kth main round. In
words, if x was conﬁrmed by players in the conﬁrmation round, and if no deviation was
26reported in the past supplemental rounds, then players play ax;k in the kth main round.
On the other hand, if player j’s deviation is reported in some supplemental round, then
players change their behavior thereafter, depending on the proﬁle x conﬁrmed in the
conﬁrmation round; they play aj(A k) if xj¡1 = B, and play aj(A k) if xj¡1 = G.
A play in the kth supplemental round is dependent on the outcome in the past com-
munication and on what happened in the kth main round. If ( ˆ m0(ht
i);¢¢¢ ; ˆ mk¡1(ht
i)) is
an element of M0(x)£M1(0)£¢¢¢£Mk¡1(0) and if all players but player i¡1 play
the action proﬁle ax;k constantly in the kth main round, then both strategies say to send
mk
i = i¡1 in the kth supplemental round. Likewise, if ( ˆ m0(ht
i);¢¢¢ ; ˆ mk¡1(ht
i)) is an
element of M0(x)£M1(0)£¢¢¢£Mk¡1(0) and if all players but player i+1 play the
action proﬁle ax;k, then both strategies say to send mk
i = i+1. Otherwise, both strate-
gies say to send mk
i = 0. In words, player i reports a deviation by player i¡1 or i+1
only when it is the ﬁrst deviation in the current block game. For periods during which
player j , i sends a message, both strategies say to play the action aG
i .
Figure 3 is a ﬂowchart of the block-game strategy sx. Note that both sG
i and sB
i are
in the set S
Tb
i of recommended strategies, since (11) holds.
Players conﬁrm x 2 X.
Play action proﬁle ax;1.
Conﬁrmation Round
First Main Round
ax;2 ai(A 2) ai(A 2)
if xi¡1 = B if xi¡1 = G













Figure 3: Block-Game Strategy Proﬁle sx





j )j,i. It shows that if player i¡1 chooses the bad strategy sB
i¡1, then
player i’s block-game payoff is less than wi no matter what player i does. On the other
27hand, if player i¡1 chooses the good strategy sG
i¡1 and if player i chooses her strategy
from the recommended set S
Tb
i , then player i’s block-game payoff is greater than wi.
Lemma 2. There is K such that for all K > K and for all T, there is d 2 (0;1) such





















Proof. The statement here is very similar to (9) of Yamamoto (2009); a difference is
that the block game of this paper contains the conﬁrmation and supplemental rounds,
which are not present in the block game of Yamamoto (2009). To prove the lemma,
note that player i’s messages in the conﬁrmation and supplemental rounds are irrelevant
under perfect monitoring, in the sense that these messages never affect the opponents’
continuation play, as long as players ¡i follow s
x¡i
¡i . Thus, players’ play in the block
game becomes very similar to that of Yamamoto (2009), and hence the result follows.
Q.E.D.
This lemma guarantees that there is a natural number K such that for any natural






































for all d 2 (d;1], i 2 I, and x¡i 2 X¡i with xi¡1 = G. Indeed, both (13) and (14) are
satisﬁed for sufﬁciently large K, as the left-hand sides of these inequalities are positive
from Lemma 2, while the term K2T
Tb , which denotes the ratio of the length of the main
rounds to that of the block game, approaches one as K ! ¥.
The speciﬁcation of K here will be maintained in the following sections.
3.3.5 Block Strategies under Private Monitoring
Now, consider the case with private monitoring. As in the two player games, play-
ers use random events yi(Aj) and yi(ai+1;ai¡1), to perform statistical tests about the
opponents’ actions. Speciﬁcally, we consider the random events speciﬁed in the next
lemma. (See Section 3.2 for the interpretation of random events).
28Lemma 3. Suppose that (CI) holds. Then, for some q1, q2, and q3 satisfying 0 < q1 <
q2 < q3 < 1, there are random events yi(Aj) : Ai £Wi ! [0;1] and yi(ai+1;ai¡1) :
Ai£Wi ! [0;1] for all i, j, a 2 A, and Aj 2 Jj such that for all ˜ a 2 A,
P(yi(Aj)j˜ a) =
(







q1 if ai¡1 = ˜ ai¡1 and ai+1 , ˜ ai+1
q3 if ai+1 = ˜ ai+1 and ai¡1 , ˜ ai¡1
q2 otherwise
:
Proof. Analogous to that of Lemma 1 of Yamamoto (2007). Q.E.D.
Let F1(t;T;r) be the probability that yi(fajg) is counted r times out of T periods
when player j chooses some ˜ aj , aj in the ﬁrst t periods and then chooses aj in the
remaining T ¡t periods. Let F2(t;T;r) be the probability that yi(ai+1;ai¡1) is counted
r times out of T periods when player i+1 chooses ˜ ai+1 , ai+1 in the ﬁrst t periods






T=1 be sequences of integers such that
Z00
T < q2T < Z0
T; (15)





























































TF1(0;T ¡1;ZT) = ¥: (19)
Note that the speciﬁcation of ZT here is the same as in the two player case, and that the
existence of Z0
T and Z00
T is guaranteed because of the law of large numbers.
As in the perfect monitoring case, we denote by ˆ x(ht
i) = (ˆ xj(ht
i))j2I player i’s infer-
ence on the message proﬁle in the signaling round. The speciﬁcation of ˆ xi(ht
i) here is
the same as in the perfect monitoring case, as player i knows what she did in the sig-
naling round. However, player i cannot observe the opponents’ action directly, so that
for each j , i, the speciﬁcation of ˆ xj(ht
i) must be modiﬁed in the following way. Given
any real number r, let [r] denote the integer part of r. Let ˆ xj(ht
i) = G if the random
event yi(faG
j g) is counted more than [
q2+2q3
3 T] times in the jth T-period interval of the
signaling round (i.e., the T-period interval from period (j¡1)T +1 to period jT of the
29block game); let ˆ xj(ht
i) = B if yi(faG
j g) is counted at most [
2q2+q3
3 T] times during this
T-period interval; and let ˆ xj(ht
i) = E for other ht
i.
Note that player i’s inference ˆ xj(ht
i) is almost perfect information about player j’s
play in the signaling round for sufﬁciently large T. Indeed, if player j sends message G
by choosing aG
j , then the random event yi(faG
j g) is counted around q3T times during
the T-period interval, which means that ˆ xj(ht




during the T-period interval, which means that ˆ xj(ht
i) = B. Note that the probability of
the erroneous histories (ˆ xj(ht
i) = E) approximates zero unless player j deviates and
mixes aG
i and aB
i in the T-period interval.
Similarly, for each j ,i, the speciﬁcation of player i’s inference on what player j re-









must be modiﬁed in the following way. Recall that, for each l = j¡1; j; j+1, player j
sends m0
j;l 2fG;B;Eg using actions in the (6(j¡1)+2(l¡ j+2)¡1)stand (6(j¡1)+
2(l ¡ j+2))nd review phases of the conﬁrmation round. Let ˆ m0
j;l(ht
i) = G if the ran-
dom event yi(faG
j g) is counted at least [
q2+q3
2 T] times in each of these review phases;
let ˆ m0
j;l(ht
i) = B if yi(faG
j g) is counted less than [
q2+q3
2 T] times in each of these re-
view phases; and let ˆ m0
j;l(ht
i) = E otherwise. Again, this statistical inference is almost
perfect, in the sense that the probability that ˆ m0
j(ht
i) coincides with player j’s message
approximates one for large T.
For each k 2 f1;¢¢¢ ;Kg and j , i, the speciﬁcation of player i’s inference on what
player j reportedinthekthsupplementalround, whichisdenotedby ˆ mk
j(ht
i), ismodiﬁed
as follows. Recall that player j sends her message mk
j 2 Mk
j using actions in the (2(j¡
1)+1)st and 2jth T-period review phase of the kth supplemental round. Let ˆ mk
j(ht
i) =
j¡1 if the random event yi(faG
j g) is counted at least [
q2+q3
2 T] times in each of these
review phases; let ˆ mk
j(ht
i) = j+1 if yi(faG
j g) is counted less than [
q2+q3
2 T] times in
each of these review phases; and let ˆ mk
j(ht
i) = 0 otherwise. Once again, these statistical
inferences are almost perfect.
Now we are ready to deﬁne the block strategies sG
i and sB
i under private monitoring.
A play in the signaling round, the conﬁrmation round, the main rounds, and the report
round is almost the same as in the perfect monitoring case; the difference is only that
the speciﬁcation of (ˆ x; ˆ m0;¢¢¢ ; ˆ mK) is modiﬁed as stated above.
So what remains is to specify a play in the supplemental rounds. The idea is very
similar to the perfect monitoring case; in the kth supplemental round, each player i
reports whether or not her neighbors deviated in the kth main round. To test what










deviated, with probability q3 if player i¡1 deviated, and with probability q2 if nobody
30deviated from ax;k. Therefore, player i can statistically distinguish whether or not her
neighbors deviated from this random event.) Speciﬁcally, if ( ˆ m0(ht
i);¢¢¢ ; ˆ mk¡1(ht
i))





i¡1) is counted more than Z0
KT times in the kth main round, then both
strategies send mk
i = i¡1 in the kth supplemental round. If ( ˆ m0(ht
i);¢¢¢ ; ˆ mk¡1(ht
i)) is





counted at most Z00
KT times in the kth main round, then both strategies send mk
i = i+1.
Otherwise, both strategies send mk
i =0. For periods where player j ,i sends a message,
both strategies play the action aG
i .
3.3.6 Comments on the Role of Additional Communication Stages
As mentioned, the block game considered here is different from that of Yamamoto
(2009), since there are additional communication stages, the conﬁrmation and supple-
mental rounds. Hence it will be useful to see how these additional communication
stages work in our setting.
The purpose of communication in the conﬁrmation round is to let players make a
consensus about what happened in the signaling round, which allows players to coor-
dinate their continuation play. That is, players can make an agreement about what the
state proﬁle x is, so that they can choose the appropriate action proﬁle ax;1 in the ﬁrst
main round. In particular, the majority rule in the conﬁrmation round is carefully con-
structed so that players can make such a consensus with high probability even if player
i unilaterally deviates in the signaling round or in the conﬁrmation round.
To see this, suppose ﬁrst that player i¡1 sent message xi¡1 in the signaling round.
Then in the conﬁrmation round, both players i¡2 and i¡1 report that player i¡1 sent
message xi¡1; thus other players conﬁrm that player (i¡1)’s message was xi¡1 without
referring to what player i says in the conﬁrmation round. A similar argument shows that
no matter what player i says in the conﬁrmation round, players can make a consensus
about what player j reported in the signaling round for each j , i.
Also, the same is true for the consensus about what player i reported in the signaling
round, no matter what player i does in the signaling and conﬁrmation rounds. To check
this, recall that player i can become a pivotal voter in the conﬁrmation round only when
players i¡1 and i+1 have opposite opinions about player i’s play in the signaling
round and send messages such that (m0
i¡1;i;m0
i+1;i) = (G;B) or (B;G); in other cases,
players make a consensus without referring to what player i says in the conﬁrmation
round. But, from the law of large numbers, the event that (m0
i¡1;i;m0
i+1;i) = (G;B) or
(B;G) is less likely, no matter what player i does in the signaling round (in particular,
even if player i mixes aG
i and aB
i in the signaling round). Therefore we can conclude
that player can make a consensus about player i’s play in the signaling round no matter
31what player i does in the signaling and conﬁrmation rounds.
In sum, players can make a consensus in the conﬁrmation round with high probabil-
ity and can coordinate a continuation play, no matter what player i does in the signaling
and conﬁrmation rounds. This implies that player i has less reason to deviate in the sig-
naling and conﬁrmation rounds, since stage-game payoffs of these rounds are almost
negligible. This property plays a key role in the proofs of Lemmas 4 and 5.
Likewise, communication in the kth supplemental round enables players to make
a consensus about whether someone unilaterally deviated in the kth main round with
high probability, no matter what player i says. This allows players to coordinate to
switch their behavior in the (k+1)st main rounds. (Recall that players stop playing
ax;k and switch to choosing ai(A ) or ai(A ) once someone’s deviation is reported in
the supplemental round.) Again, this property implies that player i has less reason to
deviate in the kth supplemental round, which is a key in the proof of Lemmas 4 and 5.
3.3.7 Block Game with Transfers
Before going to the analysis of inﬁnitely repeated games, it is convenient to consider the
following Tb-period repeated game with transfers, as in Fudenberg and Levine (1994)
and H¨ orner and Olszewski (2006). LetUi :H
Tb
i¡1 ! R, and suppose that player i receives
a transfer Ui(h
Tb
i¡1) after the Tb-period block game. Note that Ui is a function of h
Tb
i¡1,
that is, the value of the transfer depends only on player (i¡1)’s block history. Let
wA
i (sTb;Ui) denote player i’s average payoff in this auxiliary scenario given a block























i denote player i’s continuation strategy after history ht
i 2 Ht





i . Also, let BRA(s
Tb
¡ijht
¡i;Ui) be the set of player i’s best replies in the auxiliary-





block game and their past history was ht
¡i.
The following lemma shows that there is a transfer UB
i which can be regarded as
a subsidy to offset the difference between player i’s actual payoff of the block game
and the target payoff wi and to give right incentives to player i. This is an extension of
Lemma 4(a) of H¨ orner and Olszewski (2006) and Lemma 1 of Yamamoto (2009).
Lemma 4. Suppose that (CI) and (FS) hold. Then, there is T such that for all T > T,
































Proof. The outline of the proof is similar to that of Lemma 1 of Yamamoto (2009), and
what is new here is how to provide the truth-telling incentives for the conﬁrmation and
supplemental rounds, which are not present in the block game of Yamamoto (2009). As
explained in 3.3.6, the event that player i becomes a pivotal voter in the conﬁrmation
and supplemental rounds is less likely. This, together with the fact that the stage-game
payoffs for these rounds are almost negligible, implies that player i is almost indiffer-
ent over all messages in these rounds. Therefore, by giving player i a small transfer
depending on her message, one can make player i exactly indifferent over all messages.
The formal proof is found in Appendix C. Q.E.D.
Likewise, the next lemma shows that there is a transfer UG
i which can be regarded
as a ﬁne to offset the difference between player i’s actual payoff of the block game and
the target payoff wi and to give right incentives to player i.
Lemma 5. Suppose that (CI) and (FS) hold. Then, there is T such that for all T > T,































i¡1) < 0: (25)
Proof. See Appendix D. The basic idea is similar to Lemma 4. Q.E.D.
Note that the information transmitted in the report round plays a crucial role in the
construction of UB
i and UG
i . To see this, note that (20) and (23) require that player i’s
continuation play be optimal independently of the opponents’ past history h
tl
¡i. For this
to be the case, the amount of the transfersUB
i andUG
i should be adjusted contingent on
the realization of h
tl
¡i. However the transfersUB
i andUG
i cannot directly depend on h
tl
¡i,
as they are functions of player (i¡1)’s private history only. To overcome this problem,
33player i¡1 adjust the amount of the transfers UB
i and UG
i contingent on information
obtained in the report round; in the report round, each player reports what happened in
the past communication stages, so that player i¡1 can get precise information about
h
tl
¡i. This idea is very similar to Yamamoto (2009).
3.3.8 Equilibrium Construction
Now we consider the inﬁnitely repeated game, and show that for any payoff vector
v¤ 2 £i2I[wi;wi], there is a belief-free review-strategy equilibrium with payoff v¤. This
completes the proof of Proposition 2, as v is included in £i2I[wi;wi].
Fix a target payoff vector v¤ = (v¤
i )i2I from the set £i2I[wi;wi] arbitrarily. Let UB
i
and UG
i be as in Lemmas 4 and 5. For each i, player (i¡1)’s strategy in the inﬁnitely
repeated game is speciﬁed by the following automaton with initial state v¤
i 2 [wi;wi].
State wi (for wi 2 [wi;wi]) : Go to phase B with probability ai¡1, and go to phase G
with probability 1¡ai¡1 where ai¡1 satisﬁes wi = ai¡1wi+(1¡ai¡1)wi.
Phase B : Play the block strategy sB
i¡1 for Tb periods. After that, go to state wi given





i¡1 is her recent Tb-period history.
Phase G : Play the block strategy sG
i¡1 for Tb periods. After that, go to state wi given















i¡1) lie in the interval [wi;wi], and hence the above
automaton is well-deﬁned. Also, from (20), (21), (23), (24), and the one-shot deviation
principle, the constructed strategy proﬁle is a Nash equilibrium with payoff v¤. More-
over, this strategy proﬁle is a belief-free review-strategy equilibrium since (20) and (23)
hold and the block game strategy s
xi
i never mixes actions after every history.
Remark 2. In the above equilibrium construction, each review phase has different
length; the signaling and main rounds have longer review phases than those in the other
rounds. However, considering review phases with different length is not essential, and
one can construct an equilibrium with the same payoff such that each review phase has
length T. (For this, it sufﬁces to show that there are UB
i and UG
i that satisﬁes incentive
compatibility condition (20) and (23) for every T-period interval of the block game.
The proof is omitted, as it requires a longer and more complex argument.) Therefore,
Theorem 1 remains true even if we restrict attention to review strategies where each
review phase has equal length.
344 Sufﬁcient Conditions for Efﬁcient Equilibria
Theorem 1 in the previous section characterizes the limit set of belief-free review-
strategy equilibrium payoffs for general games. In this section, we apply this result
and show that efﬁciency is often approximated by belief-free review-strategy equilib-
ria. Speciﬁcally, we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 3. Suppose that the feasible payoff set is full dimensional, and that there
are action proﬁles a¤ and a¤¤ such that maxai2Aipi(ai;a¤¤
¡i) < pi(a¤) · pi(a¤¤
i ;a¤
¡i) for
all i 2 I. Then the stage game is classiﬁed to the positive case and the payoff vector
p(a¤) is an element of the right-hand side of (2). Therefore, if (CI) and (FS) hold, then
p(a¤) 2 limd!1E(d).
The proof of the proposition is provided in Appendix E. Letting a¤ be an efﬁcient
action proﬁle, this proposition gives a sufﬁcient condition for the existence of asymp-
totically efﬁcient equilibria; that is, the efﬁcient payoff vector p(a¤) can be achieved in
the limit if there is a¤¤ 2 A such that maxai2Aipi(ai;a¤¤
¡i) < pi(a¤) · pi(a¤¤
i ;a¤
¡i) for all
i 2 I. An example that satisﬁes this sufﬁcient condition is prisoner’s dilemma. Also,
this sufﬁcient condition is often satisﬁed in price-setting oligopoly markets. To see this,
let a¤
i be cartel price and a¤¤
i be “cheating” price. The above condition is satisﬁed if (i)
a ﬁrm’s proﬁt from cartel is higher than its proﬁt when all the opponents cheat, and
(ii) a ﬁrm can earn more proﬁts by cheating than by choosing cartel price when the
opponents choose cartel price. Proposition 3 asserts that under this condition, cartel is
self-enforced even if ﬁrms cannot communicate each other.
It may be noteworthy that the sufﬁcient condition here is much weaker than the one
provided by Yamamoto (2007). Theorem 1 of Yamamoto (2007) assumes the payoff
function to be almost symmetric, that is, players who choose the same action obtain
similar stage-game payoffs. Proposition 3 does not impose such a symmetry assump-
tion, so that it can apply to oligopoly markets where ﬁrms have different market shares
and/or different production functions. Also, Yamamoto (2007) imposes several as-
sumptions on a player’s stage-game payoffs when some of the opponents choose a¤
and others choose a¤¤; Proposition 3 show that these assumptions are not necessary to
approximate efﬁciency.6
The next proposition shows that even the folk theorem is established if more as-
sumptions are imposed on the payoff function. This is a generalization of Theorem
2 of Matsushima (2004) to N-player games. The stage game is an N-player pris-
oner’s dilemma if jIj = N; Ai = fCi;Dig for all i 2 I; pi(Di;a¡i) ¸ pi(Ci;a¡i) for all
i 2 I and a¡i 2 A¡i; pi(Cj;a¡j) ¸ pi(Dj;a¡j) for all i 2 I, j , i and a¡j 2 A¡j; and
6Note also that the sufﬁcient condition provided by Proposition 3 is weaker than that of Theorem 1
of Matsushima (2004).
35pi(C1;¢¢¢ ;CN) > pi(D1;¢¢¢ ;DN) for all i 2 I. In words, defection weakly dominates
cooperation, cooperation weakly increases opponents’ proﬁts, and mutual cooperation
yields higher payoffs than mutual defection.
Proposition 4. Suppose that the stage game is an N-player prisoner’s dilemma, and
the feasible payoff set is full dimensional. Suppose also that (CI) and (FS) hold. Then,
limd!1E(d) exactly equals the feasible and individually rational payoff set.
The proof is similar to Proposition 3 of Yamamoto (2009), and hence omitted.
5 Almost-Independent Monitoring
This section demonstrates that the limit characterization result is robust to a pertur-
bation of the monitoring structure, i.e., Theorem 1 remains valid even under almost-
independent monitoring.
To formalize the concept of “almost-independent monitoring,” we introduce a mea-
sure of closeness between distinct signal distributions. The following notion is at-
tributed to Mailath and Morris (2006): For a ﬁxed (I;(Ai;pi;Wi)i2I), the signal distri-
















for all a and w. The following proposition shows that if there is a belief-free review
strategy equilibrium with payoff v under (CI), then v can be achieved even if the moni-
toring structure is slightly perturbed so that the monitoring is almost independent.
Proposition 5. Suppose that a stage game (I;(Ai;Wi;pi;qi)i2I) satisﬁes (CI) and (FS).
Suppose also that this game is classiﬁed to the positive case. Then, for any payoff vector
v in the interior of the right-hand side of (2), there are d 2 (0;1) and e > 0 such that
for any d 2(d;1) and for any signal distribution e-close to (qi)i2I, there is a belief-free
review-strategy equilibrium with payoff v.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. As shown in Section 3.2, under (CI),
a player’s private signal has no information about the opponents’ signals. and thus no
feedback on what the opponents will do in a continuation play. Therefore, players have
no incentive to deviate to a history-dependent strategy within a review phase, which
is a key element in the proof of Theorem 1. When (CI) is violated, a player’s pri-
vate signal contains some information about the opponents’ signals so that players may
want to play history-dependent strategies; however, if the signal distribution is almost
36independent (i.e., taking e close to zero), then a player’s private signal has almost no
information about the opponents’ signals. Therefore, given a T, when we take e sufﬁ-
ciently close to zero, playing a history-dependent strategy becomes suboptimal and we
can construct an equilibrium as in the case of conditionally-independent monitoring.
The formal proof is omitted, as it is straightforward.
37Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 4
Consider the positive case, and let s 2 S be a belief-free review-strategy equilibrium
with sequence (tl)¥
l=0. Let Ai(l) denote the set of player i’s actions taken with positive
probability in the initial period of the lth review phase for some history. That is, Ai(l)
is the union of the support of si(h
tl¡1





Since s is strongly belief-free in the lth review phase, player i’s continuation payoff
after history htl¡1 2 Htl¡1 is independent of her own private history h
tl¡1
i . So let us
denote this continuation payoff by wi(h
tl¡1




¡i and a¡i 2
suppfs¡i(h
tl¡1
¡i )g, let wi(h
tl¡1
¡i ;a¡i) denote player i’s continuation payoff from the lth
review phase when the opponents’ history in the past review phases is h
tl¡1
¡i and they
play the constant action a¡i in the lth review phase. Then
wi(h
tl¡1











¡i . Also, since s is strongly belief-free in the lth review phase,
wi(h
tl¡1

















¡i , a¡i 2suppfs¡i(h
tl¡1





¡i ;a) denotes the probability of the realization of h
tl
¡i given that the
history up to the end of the (l¡1)th review phase is h
tl¡1
¡i and players choose the action
proﬁle a 2 A constantly in the lth review phase.
For each l ¸ 1, let wl
i be player i’s best continuation payoff from the lth review
phase, i.e, wl
i is the maximum of wi(h
tl¡1



















¡i and a¡i 2 suppfs¡i(h
tl¡1










¡i . This implies that
wl
i · (1¡dtl¡tl¡1)vi(A (l))+dtl¡tl¡1wl+1
i : (28)
Likewise, let wl
i be the minimum of wi(h
tl¡1



















¡i and a¡i 2 suppfs¡i(h
tl¡1
¡i )g. Then, as in the above argument,
wl
i ¸ (1¡dtl¡tl¡1)vi(A (l))+dtl¡tl¡1wl+1
i : (29)
Iterating (28) and (29) and using (26), it turns out that wi(h
tl¡1
¡i ) is in the interval




¡i , where pl 2 4J is deﬁned to be
pl(A ) = å
fk¸l j A (k)=A g
dtk¡1¡tl¡1(1¡dtk¡tk¡1) (30)
for all A 2 J. Therefore the equilibrium payoff vector (wi(s))i2I is in the product set
£i2I[p1vi;p1vi]. On the other hand, from the feasibility constraint, (wi(s))i2I 2V(p1).
Taken together, (wi(s))i2I is in the intersection of V(p1) and £i2I[p1vi;p1vi]. This
proves that the right-hand side of (2) includes E(d) in the positive case.
Next, consider the empty case. Suppose that there is a belief-free review-strategy
equilibrium s 2 S. Then as in the positive case, the equilibrium payoff wi(s) must be in
the interval [p1vi;p1vi] for all i 2 I. However, since this is the empty case, there is i 2 I
such that p1vi > p1vi, that is, the interval [p1vi;p1vi] is empty. This is a contradiction,
and hence there is no belief-free review-strategy equilibrium.
Finally, consider the negative case. Since playing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
in every period is a belief-free review-strategy equilibrium, limd!1E(d) includes the
convex hull of the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium payoffs of the stage game.
Hence, it sufﬁces to show that E(d) is included in the convex hull of the set of pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium payoffs for every d 2 (0;1).
Let s 2 S be a belief-free review-strategy equilibrium. As in the positive case, for
each i 2 I and l ¸ 1, wi(h
tl¡1
¡i ) is included in the interval [plvi;plvi], which must be a
singleton in the negative case. This implies that no dynamic incentive is provided in
this equilibrium, and hence in every review phase, player i’s action must be a static best
reply to any outcome of the opponents’ mixture (here, the optimality after the mixture
is required, since s is strongly belief-free in every review phase). Thus a pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium is played in every period, which completes the proof.
Appendix B: Incentive Compatibility for Two-Player Games
In this appendix, we show that the strategy proﬁle presented in Section 3.2.3 constitutes
a belief-free review-strategy equilibrium with payoff v¤.
The following lemma asserts that the automaton is well-deﬁned if T is large enough
and d is close to one.













Proof. Part (i). Since v¤ is an interior point of £i2I[pvi;pvi¡h] and (9) holds, v¤
i is in
the state space [wi;wi] if T is large enough. This proves (i).
Part (ii). Using (4) and (5), it follows that limT!¥l
B;A ;l
i ¸ 0 for all A and l. Like-
wise, from (4), (5), and pi(a
G;A ;jAij
i ;aA







i = C. These observations, together with (9), completes the
proof. Q.E.D.
The next step is to show that the speciﬁed strategy proﬁle constitutes an equilibrium
and achieves v¤, assuming that players are constrained to a constant action in every T-
period review phase. Suppose that player ¡i chooses aA
¡i in the current review phase.





¡i is the history in the current review phase. (Note that this is
the same as assuming that player i’s continuation payoff is wi when the opponent is in
phase B, and her continuation payoff is wi when the opponent is in phase G.) Then, for




























Using (7) and pi(a
B;A ;1
i ;aA












which does not depend on l. Therefore we can conclude that player i is indifferent over
all actions against aA
¡i. Also, multiplying by p(A ) and summing over all A 2J show
that when player ¡i is in phase B, player i’s expected payoff is indeed wi.
Suppose next that player ¡i chooses aA
¡i in the current review phase, and that player































40Note that the payoff from a
G;A ;l
i does not depend on l, and hence player i is indifferent
over all actions ai 2 Ai Also, since C > maxai2Aipi(ai;aA
¡i)¡vi(A ), the payoff from
ai < Ai is less than that from a
G;A ;l
i . Hence, playing ai 2 Ai is a best reply against aA
¡i.
Also, multiplying the payoff by p(A ) and summing over all A 2 J show that when
player ¡i is in phase G, player i’s expected payoff is wi. Therefore, the strategy proﬁle
speciﬁed by the above automaton with the initial state (v¤
2;v¤
1) is an equilibrium in the
constrained game, and yields the target payoff v¤.
What remains is to establish that this strategy proﬁle is an equilibrium even if play-
ers are not restricted to a constant action. Recall that under (CI), player i’s signal wi has
no information about the opponent’ signal, so that player i cannot be better off by con-
ditioning her play on observed signals. Hence, it sufﬁces to show that player i cannot
proﬁt by deviating to any sequence of actions with length T.
First, consider the case where player ¡i chooses aA
¡i in the current review phase.
As mentioned, for any a¤
i 2 Ai and a¤¤
i , a¤
i , player i is indifferent between playing a¤
i
for T periods and playing a¤¤
i for T periods. In what follows, we show that player i
prefers playing a¤
i for T periods to mixing two actions a¤
i and a¤¤
i (i.e., playing a¤
i for
t periods and playing a¤¤





¡i). Let l¤ be the integer l satisfying a
B;A ;l
i = a¤
i and let l¤¤ be
the integer l satisfying a
B;A ;l
i = a¤¤
i . Without loss of generality, assume l¤ > l¤¤, so that
Dpi ¸ 0. For each t 2 f0;¢¢¢ ;Tg, let Wi(t) denote player i’s (unnormalized) payoff to
playing a¤¤
i in the ﬁrst t periods and a¤






























1¡dT )¡g(t). Then, thereisT suchthatforeveryT >T,
h(t) is negative for all t 2 f1;¢¢¢ ;T ¡1g.
Proof. This directly follows from (28) of Ely, H¨ orner, and Olszewski (2005). Note that
(6) is used here. Q.E.D.
Suppose ﬁrst that Dpi > 0. Applying this lemma to (31), it follows that in the limit
as d ! 1, player i strictly prefers playing a¤
i constantly to mixing a¤
i and a¤¤
i . By
continuity, she strictly prefers a constant action a¤
i even if d is slightly less than one.
41Suppose next that Dpi = 0. Then (31) implies that player i weakly prefers playing a¤
i
constantly to mixing a¤
i and a¤¤
i for any d 2 (0;1). Thus, in both cases, player i prefers
playing a constant action to mixing two actions.
By a similar argument, player i prefers mixing n actions to mixing n+1 actions.7
Hence, playing an action ai 2Ai for T periods is a best reply against aA
¡i. Likewise, one
can show that playing an action ai 2 Ai constantly is a best reply against aA
¡i.
In summary, if T is sufﬁciently large so that the conditions in Lemmas 6 and 7 are
satisﬁed, then there is d 2(0;1) such that for all d 2(d;1), the strategy proﬁle speciﬁed
by the automaton constitutes a belief-free review-strategy equilibrium, and achieves v¤.
This completes the proof.
Appendix C: Proof of Lemma 4
Let ui : Ai¡1 £Wi¡1 ! R be such that pi(a)+E[ui(ai¡1;wi¡1)ja] = 0 for all a 2 A.
The existence of such ui is guaranteed from the full rank condition. Let ui denote the
maximum of jui(ai¡1;wi¡1)j over all ai¡1 2 Ai¡1 and wi¡1 2 Wi¡1.
For each k 2 f1;¢¢¢ ;Kg, let h
[k]
i denote player i’s private history up to the end of the
kth supplemental round. Also, let h
[k;m]
i be player i’s history up to the end of the kth
main round. Let h
[0]
i be player i’s history up to the end of the conﬁrmation round, and
h
[¡1]
i be player i’s history up to the end of the signaling round. For each k, let H
[k]
i be
the set of all h
[k]
i , and H
[k;m]
i be the set of all h
[k;m]
i .
Recall that a player’s message space in the report round is M0 £M1 £¢¢¢£MK,
i.e., a player reports what happened in the past communication stages. Given player




i¡1, let I¡i 2(M0£¢¢¢£MK)N¡1 denote player (i¡1)’s
inference on the messages from players ¡i in the report round. Notice that player i’s
actions in the report round cannot affect the realization of I¡i, since player i¡1 makes
her inference on player j’s message using the random event yi¡1(faG
j g) and Lemma 3
asserts that player i cannot manipulate the realizations of this random event. For each
k 2 f0;¢¢¢ ;Kg, let Ik
¡i be the projection of I¡i onto (M0£M1£¢¢¢£Mk)N¡1. That is,
Ik
¡i denotes player (i¡1)’s inference on the messages from players ¡i corresponding
to the history up to the kth supplemental round.
7The formal proof is as follows. With an abuse of notation, let Wi(t) denote player i’s payoff to
playing a¤¤
i for t periods, playing a¤














Using Lemma 7, one can conﬁrm that player i is (weakly) better off by playing a¤
i for ˜ T periods rather
than playing a¤¤
i for t periods and a¤
i for ˜ T ¡t periods.
42Without loss of generality, consider a particular i 2 I. We consider UB
i which is























Intuitively, player i receives a transfer q¡1 after the signaling round, q0 after the con-
ﬁrmation round, qk after the kth supplemental round for each k 2f1;¢¢¢ ;Kg, and qK+1
after the report round.
In this transfer scheme, the transfers for the past rounds are irrelevant to player i’s
incentive compatibility. For example, consider the report round. Note that the transfer
q¡1 is a function of (h
[¡1]
i¡1 ), and hence does not depend on the history in the report
round. Likewise, the transfer q0 does not depend on the history in the report round.
Moreover, for each k 2 f1;¢¢¢ ;Kg, qk depends on the history in the report round only
through Ik
¡i, and player i’s action in the report round cannot affect the realization of
Ik
¡i. Therefore, the transfers (q¡1;¢¢¢ ;qK) are irrelevant to player i’s incentive compat-
ibility in the report round, i.e., player i maximizes the sum of the stage game payoffs
and the transfer qK+1 in the report round. Likewise, one can check that the transfers
(q¡1;¢¢¢ ;qk¡1) are irrelevant to player i’s incentive compatibility in the continuation
game from the kth main round.
In what follows, we show that there are transfers (q¡1;¢¢¢ ;qK+1) satisfying (20)
through (22). To simplify the notation, let XB denote the set of all x 2 X satisfying
xi¡1 = B. Likewise, let XB
¡i be the set of all x¡i 2 X¡i satisfying xi¡1 = B.
C.1 Constructing qK+1
Note ﬁrst that the transfer q¡1 is a function of (h
[¡1]
i¡1 ), and hence does not depend on
the history in the report round. Likewise, the transfer q0 does not depend on the history
in the report round. Moreover, for each k 2 f1;¢¢¢ ;Kg, qk depends on the history in
the report round only through Ik
¡i, and player i’s action in the report round cannot affect
the realization of Ik
¡i. Therefore, the transfers (q¡1;¢¢¢ ;qK) are irrelevant to player i’s
incentive compatibility in the report round, i.e., player i maximizes the sum of the stage














i¡1) is player (i¡1)’s action and signal in the tth period of the report
round. Recall that pi(a)+åw q(wja)ui(ai¡1;wi¡1) = 0 for all a 2 A. Thus the term
ui(at
i¡1;wt
i¡1) offsets the stage game payoff in the tth period of the report round, and
43hence player i is indifferent among all actions in every period of the report round,
regardless of the past history. This shows that (20) holds for all l ¸1+6N+K(1+2N),
htl 2 Htl, and x 2 XB.
Also, since the term
wi¡wi











i¡1, provided that d is close to one.
C.2 Constructing qk for all k 2 f1;:::;Kg
In this step, the following notation is useful. For each x 2 X, let H
[0]













j ); ˆ m0
i (˜ h
[0]




j )=( ˆ m0
l (h
[0]
j ))l,i, In words, H
[0]
¡i(x) is the set of all histories up to the end
of the conﬁrmation round such that player j , i will play a
x;1




j ) = sB
j(h
[0]
j ) = a
x;1
j if ˆ m0(h
[0]
j ) 2 M0(x)) even if her inference on the








¡i(x) implies that player i’s message in the conﬁrmation round





¡i(x) is a “regular history” when nobody deviates from the block
strategy proﬁle sx. For example, when players play sx under perfect monitoring, one
can check that ˆ m0
¡i(h
[0]










¡i(x) approximates one as T ! ¥. (See the discussion in Section 3.3.6.)
Likewise, for each k 2 f1;¢¢¢ ;K¡1g and x 2 X, let H
[k]












j ); ˆ m1(h
[k]
j );¢¢¢ ; ˆ mk¡1(h
[k]















j ) = ( ˆ mk
l(h
[k]
j ))l,i. That is, H
[k]
¡i(x) is the set of all histories up to the kth
supplemental round such that player j , i will play a
x;k+1
j in the (k+1)st main round
even if the inference on player i’s message in the kth supplemental round is replaced




¡i(x) implies that player i’s message in the
44kth supplemental round is irrelevant to players ¡i’s continuation play. Again, one can
check that these are “regular histories” when nobody deviates from the block strategy
proﬁle sx.
Also, for each k 2 f1;¢¢¢ ;Kg let H
[k]




¡i such that there is







j ); ˆ m1(h
[k]
j );¢¢¢ ; ˆ mn¡1(h
[k]












Note that if M0(x)£M1(0)£¢¢¢£Mn¡1(0) and ˆ mn(h
[k]
j ) 2 Mn(i) for some n · k, then
player j chooses ai
j(A k+1) in the (k+1)st main round, irrespective of the history after
the nth supplemental round. Thus H
[k]
¡i(x;i) is the set of histories up to the kth sup-
plemental round such that player i’s message in the kth supplemental round cannot
affect the opponents’ continuation play and they will play ai(A ) or ai(A ). Roughly
speaking, these are histories reachable by player i’s unilateral deviation. To see this,
suppose that monitoring is perfect and that players follow sx but player i unilaterally
deviates from ax;n in the nth main round. Then both players i¡1 and i+1 detect this
deviation and send the messages mn
i¡1 = i and mn
i+1 = i in the nth supplemental round,
while player j , i¡1;i;i+1 sends mn
j = 0. In this case, player i’s action in the nth




For notational convenience, let H
[0]
¡i denote a union of H
[0]
¡i(x) over all x 2 XB. Also,
for each k 2 f1;¢¢¢ ;Kg, let H
[k]




¡i(x;i)) over all x 2 XB.
In what follows, the transfers (q1;¢¢¢ ;qK) are speciﬁed by backward induction. To





¡i, augmentedby (qk+1;¢¢¢ ;qK+1), isequalto
Vi(h
[k]
¡i), and that (20) holds for all l ¸ 1+6N+k(1+2N), htl 2 Htl, and x 2 XB. Here,






¡i) is deﬁned to be the maximum
of player i’s actual continuation payoff (i.e., the discounted sum of stage game payoffs)
after history h
[k]
¡i over all her continuation strategies, subject to the constraints that mon-







¡i) is deﬁned to be the maximum of player i’s actual
continuation payoff after history ˜ h
[0]




¡i and over all her continuation
strategies, subject to the constraints that monitoring is perfect and that payoffs in the







¡i) is deﬁned to be player i’s actual continuation payoff when she earns
45maxa2Api(a) in periods of the main rounds and zero in other periods. Notice that the
transfers (q1;¢¢¢ ;qK) are speciﬁed in such a way that player i’s continuation payoff
Vi(h
[k]





explained later, this “constant continuation payoff” property is used to show that player





so that player i’s message in that round can affect the opponents’ continuation play.





¡i augmented by (qk;¢¢¢ ;qK+1) is equal to Vi(h
[k¡1]
¡i ), and such that
(20) holds for all l ¸ 1+6N +(k¡1)(1+2N), htl 2 Htl, and x 2 XB. Iterating this





¡i is equal toVi(h
[k¡1]
¡i ) for all k 2f1;¢¢¢ ;Kg, and such that (20) holds





¡i is equal to Vi(h
[K]
¡i ) = 0 and such that (20) holds for all l ¸
1+6N+K(1+2N).)

















i¡1) is player (i¡1)’s action and signal in the tth period of the kth sup-
plemental round, and ˜ qk is a real-valued function of h
[k;m]
i¡1 and Ik¡1
¡i . Although ˜ qk has
not been speciﬁed yet, the following lemma is established.
Lemma8. Playeriisindifferentoverallactionsineveryperiodofthekthsupplemental
round regardless of the past history, and hence (20) holds for all l ¸ 2+6N +(k¡
1)(1+2N).
Proof. As in the report round, the second term in the right-hand side of (33) off-




¡i ) does not depend on the outcome in the kth supplemental round. Thus, it
sufﬁces to show that player i’s action in the kth supplemental round does not affect the
continuation payoff after the kth supplemental round with (qk+1;¢¢¢ ;qK+1).





¡i) is independent of players ¡i’s inferences on player i’s message in the
kth supplemental round. Therefore, player i’s actions in the (2i¡1)st and 2ith review
phases cannot affect the continuation payoff. Also, player i cannot manipulate player
j’s inference on messages from the other players, since player i’s action cannot affect
the realization of the corresponding random events. Hence, player i’s actions in other
periods cannot affect the continuation payoff as well. Q.E.D.





¡i and ai 2 Ai, let ˜ Wi(h
[k¡1]
¡i ;ai) denote player i’s continuation payoff from
46the kth main round, augmented by (qk+1;¢¢¢ ;qK+1) and by the second term of the
right-hand side of (33), when player i plays ai constantly in the kth main round and
plays a best reply thereafter. That is, ˜ Wi(h
[k¡1]

























¡i ;ai) denotes the probability that h
[k]
¡i realizes when player i plays ai
constantly in the kth main round and sends mk
i = 0 in the kth supplemental round while




. Note that the ﬁrst term is the stage game payoff in the kth
main round, and the second is the continuation payoff after the kth supplemental round
augmented by (qk+1;¢¢¢ ;qK+1). The stage game payoffs in the kth supplemental round
does not appear here, as the second term of the right-hand side of (33) offset them.




j , let Jk¡1
j denote the history in the conﬁrmation








j )j,i 2 (M0£¢¢¢£Mk¡1)N¡1. Note that ˜ Wi(h
[k¡1]
¡i ;ai) does not depend on
the entire information of h
[k¡1]
¡i but on Jk¡1











¡i )) be an order-









































i¡1 ) = 0 otherwise. Likewise, for each ai 2 Ai, let 1ai : H
[k;m]
i¡1 ! f0;1g be the
indicator function such that 1ai(h
[k;m]
i¡1 ) = 1 if and only if the random event yi¡1(faig)
is counted more than ZKT times in the kth main round.




















for all x¡i 2 XB





















































i¡1 ) takes one given that player i chooses the constant action








¡i ) denotes the probability that Ik¡1
¡i realizes given that the history at the
beginning of the kth main round is h
[k¡1]
¡i . In words, the values (lk(Ik¡1
¡i ;l))Ik¡1
¡i ;l are
determined so that player i’s unnormalized continuation payoff after h
[k¡1]
¡i augmented
by (qk;¢¢¢ ;qK+1) equals Vi(h
[k¡1]
¡i ), no matter what constant action player i chooses in
the kth main round. Indeed, the right-hand side of (36) denotes player i’s continuation
payoff after h
[k¡1]
¡i when player i chooses ai constantly in the kth main round and plays
a best reply thereafter.
Lemma 9. There is T such that for all T > T, there is d 2 (0;1) such that for all











¡i . Also, using this transfer scheme, (20) holds for all l ¸ 1+6N +























i¡1) is player (i¡1)’s action and signal in the tth period of the conﬁr-
mation round. As in the report round, this q0 offsets the stage game payoffs in the tth
period of the conﬁrmation round. In addition, as in the proof of Lemma 8, one can show
that player i’s actions in the conﬁrmation round cannot affect the expected continuation
48payoffs from the ﬁrst main round augmented by (q1;¢¢¢ ;qK+1). Therefore, player i is
indifferent among all actions in every period of the conﬁrmation round regardless of
the past history, and hence (20) holds for all l ¸ 1, htl 2 Htl, and x 2 XB.











i¡1, provided that d is close to one.
C.4 Constructing q¡1
For each x2X, let H
[¡1]









i g) is counted more than ZT times during the T-period interval from period
(i¡1)T +1 to period iT. Then, for each x 2 X, let 1x : H
[¡1]
i¡1 ! f0;1g denote the
indicator function of H
[¡1]
i¡1 (x). That is, 1x(h
[¡1]






















i¡1) is player (i¡1)’s private history in the tth period of the block game,































for all x¡i 2 XB
¡i. Here, Pr(h
[¡1]
i¡1 jsx) denotes the probability that h
[¡1]
i¡1 realizes when
players perform the block strategy proﬁle sx, and Pr(h
[0]
¡ijsx) denotes the probability of
h
[0]
¡i. Intuitively, the values (l¡1(x))x2XB are determined so that (21) holds. Indeed,
the right-hand side of (39) denotes player i’s auxiliary scenario payoff from the block
strategy proﬁle sx. (Precisely, the ﬁrst term denotes the expectation of the payment q¡1
other than the term ui, and the second term denotes the expectation of the continuation
payoff after the conﬁrmation round. The stage game payoffs in the signaling round and
the conﬁrmation round do not appear here, since these payoffs and the term ui in q¡1
and q0 cancel out.)
49Lemma 10. There is T such that for all T > T, there is d 2 (0;1) such that for all
d 2 (d;1), system (39) has a unique solution, and it satisﬁes










i¡1 . Also, under this transfer scheme, (20) and (21) hold for all l ¸ 0,
htl 2 Htl, and x 2 XB.
Proof. See Appendix C.5.3. Q.E.D.
ThislemmaassertsthatthespeciﬁedUB
i satisﬁes(20)and(21). Finally, (22)follows
from (13), (14), (32), (37), (38), and (40).
C.5 Remaining Proofs
C.5.1 Proof of Lemma 9
Part 1. Proof of Uniqueness. Observe that the value Vi(h
[k¡1]
¡i ) does not depend on
the entire information of h
[k¡1]
¡i but on Jk¡1
¡i , since the continuation strategy of players
¡i from the kth main round depends only on Jk¡1
¡i . Thus write Vi(Jk¡1
¡i ) instead of
Vi(h
[k¡1]
¡i ). Likewise, one can replace h
[k¡1]
¡i with Jk¡1
¡i in each term of the right-hand
side of (36). Therefore, solving (36) is equivalent to considering the following system:
Vi(Jk¡1



















¡i and ai 2 Ai.
Note that (41) is represented by the matrix form
Qlk = b: (42)
Here, lk is a column vector with elements lk(Ik¡1
¡i ;l) for all Ik¡1
¡i and l 2 f1;¢¢¢ ;jAijg;





¡i ;ai); and b is a column vector denoting the remaining terms, i.e., each














Without loss of generality, assume that for each n, there is Ik¡1
¡i such that for each
l 2 f1;¢¢¢ ;jAijg, the (njAij+l)th coordinate of lk is lk(Ik¡1
¡i ;l) and the (njAij+l)th
50coordinate of b is b(Jk¡1
¡i ;al
i(Jk¡1
¡i )) where Jk¡1
¡i satisﬁes Ik¡1
¡i = Jk¡1
¡i . (This assumption
is indeed satisﬁed by exchanging rows of lk and b in an appropriate way.)
It follows from (17) and (18) that, as T ! ¥, Pr(Ik¡1
¡i jJk¡1
¡i ) converges to one if
Ik¡1
¡i = Jk¡1
¡i , and to zero otherwise. Likewise, Pr(1[Ik¡1
¡i ;l]jJk¡1
¡i ;ai) converges to one if
















where D is the jAij£jAij matrix such that its ij-element equals one if i ¸ j and zero if
i < j. Since the above matrix is invertible, there is an inverse of Q for sufﬁciently large
T, and (42) has a unique solution Q¡1b.
Part 2. Proof of (37). From (17) and (18), Pr(1˜ aijJk¡1
¡i ;ai) converges as T ! ¥ to




























> > > > > <






¡i )¡ ˜ Wi(Jk¡1
¡i ;l)
T






¡i ;l¡1)¡ ˜ Wi(Jk¡1
¡i ;l)
T
if l ¸ 2
Byconstruction, limT!¥limd!1
Vi(Jk¡1




¡i ;l¡1)¡ ˜ Wi(Jk¡1
¡i ;l)
T ¸
0 for each l ¸ 2. Thus, from (35), limT!¥limd!1
˜ qk
T is at least ¡Kh. Substituting this
into (33) and using continuity, it follows that there is T such that for all T > T, there is
d 2 (0;1) such that for all d 2 (d;1), (37) still holds.







¡i ) if she chooses a constant action in the kth main round
andplaysabestreplythereafter. Thisimpliesthatplayeriisindifferentoverallconstant
actions. Hence, it sufﬁces to show that player i is worse off if she does not take a












i’s continuation payoff after h
[k¡1]
¡i , augmented by (qk;¢¢¢ ;qK+1), when player i per-
forms a KT-length sequence of actions (at
i)KT
t=1 in the kth main round and plays a best

























































t=1) is deﬁned as Pr(¢jh
[k¡1]
¡i ;ai) but player i plays the sequence
(at
i)KT
t=1, rather than the constant action ai, in the kth main round.





¡i , and (at
i)KT
t=1 2 (Ai)KT satisfying at
i , a˜ t








Proof. See Appendix C.5.2. Q.E.D.
This lemma asserts that in the case of d = 1, player i is worse off by playing a
sequence (at
i)KT
t=1 in the kth main round, provided that at
i , a˜ t
i for some t and ˜ t. Also, it
follows from Lemma 3 that player i cannot earn proﬁt even if she conditions the play
on private signals. Hence, if d = 1, (20) holds for all l ¸ 1+6N +(k¡1)(1+2N),
htl 2 Htl, and x 2 XB.
SinceVi andWi are continuous with respect to d, (44) is still satisﬁed after perturb-
ing d. Hence, (20) holds, provided that d is large enough.
C.5.2 Proof of Lemma 11




¡i . Pick arbitrary
actions a¤
i 2 Ai and a¤¤
i , a¤























t=1) for such a (at
i)KT
t=1. In what follows, it
is shown thatWi(t)<Vi(h
[k¡1]
¡i ) for each t 2f1;¢¢¢ ;KT ¡1g, that is, playing a constant




¡i , let l¤(Ik¡1
¡i ) be the integer l such that al
i(Ik¡1
¡i ) = a¤
i , and l¤¤(Ik¡1
¡i ) be
the integer l such that al
i(Ik¡1
¡i ) = a¤¤
i . Let I k¡1
¡i denote the set of all Ik¡1
¡i satisfying
l¤(Ik¡1
¡i ) > l¤¤(Ik¡1









(q3¡q2)F(KT ¡t) if ˜ ai = a¤
i














(q2¡q3)F(t ¡1) if Ik¡1
¡i 2 I k¡1
¡i
(q3¡q2)F(KT ¡t) if Ik¡1
¡i < I k¡1
¡i
;





































































Let D1(t) be the terms in the second line of the right-hand side, and D2(t) be the
remaining terms. The following lemma is useful to evaluate D2(t).
Lemma 12. There is T > 0 such that for all T > T, there is t such that D2(t) is
negative for t = 1; non-positive for all t · t; non-negative for all t > t; and positive
for t = KT.
Proof. Observe that ¡D2(t) is identiﬁed as T ˜ Wi(t) in (48) of Yamamoto (2007). In-
deed, the terms in the ﬁrst line of the right-hand side of (46) corresponds to the term
pi, the ﬁrst term in the third line and the term in the ﬁfth line correspond to the term
åj2IC KT
j TF(t ¡1), and the second term in the third line and the term in the ﬁfth line
correspond to the term åj2IDKT
j TF(T ¡t). Thus, there exists the desired t as shown
by (54) of Yamamoto (2007). Q.E.D.
53The next two lemmas show that D1(t) = 0 for some cases.








¡i (x;i) for some x 2 XB. Then
D1(t) = 0 for all t.













¡i ;t) = 1.
This shows that D1(t) = 0, since Vi(h
[k]



























¡i (x) for some x 2 XB, a¤
i , a
x;k




Then D1(t) = 0 for all t.
Proof. Observe that player i’s action in the kth main round affects the realization of
h
[k]








Likewise, the probability that yi+1(x;k) occurs against (a¤
i ;a
x;k












¡i ;t ¡ 1) for all t, and hence
D1(t) = 0. Q.E.D.








¡i (x;i) for some x2XB, then





¡i ) >Wi(t) for all t 2 f1;¢¢¢ ;KT ¡1g, as desired.
Likewise, using Lemmas 12 and 14, one can show that Vi(h
[k¡1]
¡i ) > Wi(t) for all




¡i (x) for some x 2 XB, a¤
i , a
x;k




















¡i (x) for some x 2 XB and a¤
i = a
x;k
i . If T is
large enough, then D1(t) is non-negative for all t.
Proof. It follows from Lemma 3 that playing the action a¤
i exactly t times instead of
t ¡1 times in the kth main round decreases the probability that player i¡1 sends the
message mk
i¡1 = i and the probability that player i+1 sends the message mk
i+1 = i,
while it increases the probability that player i¡1 sends the message mk
i¡1 = i¡2 and
the probability that player i+1 sends the message mk












































These inequalities show that D1(t) is non-negative, sinceVi(h
[k]



















¡i (x) for some x 2 XB and a¤
i = a
x;k
i . Then, for
any r 2 (0;1) and n ¸ 1, å
[rKT]
t=1 D1(t)= o(T¡n). Here, [rKT] denotes the integer part
of rKT.
Proof. Let DPr(mk
i¡1 = ijt) denote the decrease in the probability of mk
i¡1 = i when
player i chooses the action a¤





i¡2jt) be the increase in the probability of mk
i¡1 = i¡2, and DPr(mk
i+1 = i+2jt) be
the increase in the probability of mk
i+1 = i+2.






i+1 = i+2jt): (47)
Here, C1(t) measures how much the expected value of Vi(h
[k]
¡i) increases when the
probability of mk
i¡1 = i decreases, while the probability of mk
i+1 = i, the probability
of mk
i¡1 = i¡2, and the probability of mk
i+1 = i+2 are ﬁxed (these probabilities are
calculatedasifa¤
i ischosent¡1timesinthekthmainround);C2(t)denoteshowmuch
the expected value of Vi(h
[k]
¡i) increases when the probability of mk
i+1 = i decreases,
while the probabilities of mk
i¡1 = i, the probability of mk
i¡1 = i¡2, and the probability
of mk
i+1 = i+2 are ﬁxed (the probability of mk
i¡1 = i is calculated as if a¤
i is chosen
t times, and the others are calculated as if a¤
i is chosen t ¡1 times); and so on. By
deﬁnition,
0 ·Cn(t) · DVi (48)






















KT). Then, from Lemma 3
DPr(mk
i¡1 = ijt) = (q2¡q1)F00
2 (KT ¡t);
DPr(mk
i+1 = ijt) = (q3¡q2)F0
1(t ¡1);
DPr(mk




i+1 = i+2jt) = (q3¡q2)F00
1 (t ¡1):










where Dq = maxfq2¡q1; q3¡q2g. To complete the proof, one needs to ﬁnd a bound
on the right-hand side. The following claims are useful to obtain such a bound. See
Appendix C.5.5 for the proofs.
Claim 1. For any r 2 [0;1) and n ¸ 1, F1([rT]¡1;T ¡1;Z0
T) = o(T¡n) as T ! ¥.
Also, for any r 2 (0;1] and n ¸ 1, F2(T ¡[rT];T ¡1;Z00
T) = o(T¡n) as T ! ¥.
Claim 2. For any r 2(0;1), there exists T such that for any T >T and any t <[rKT],
F00
2 (KT ¡t) · F00
2 (KT ¡[rKT]), F0
1(t ¡1) · F0
1([rKT]¡1), F0
2(KT ¡t) · F0
2(KT ¡
[rKT]), and F00
1 (t ¡1) · F00
1 ([rKT]¡1).
Claim 3. For any r 2 [0;1), F1([rT]¡1;T ¡1;Z00
T) · F1([rT]¡1;T ¡1;Z0
T) if T is
large enough. Also, for any r 2 (0;1], F2(T ¡[rT];T ¡1;Z0
T) · F2(T ¡[rT];T ¡
1;Z00
T) if T is large enough.











Notice that DVi = O(T), sinceVi(h
[k]
¡i) = O(T). On the other hand, Claim 1 implies that
F00
2 (KT ¡[rKT]) = o(T¡n) and F0




Lemma 17. There are r 2 (0;1) and T such that for any T > T and t > rKT, the
value å
KT
˜ t=t D2(˜ t) is positive.
Proof. Let Dpi denote the ﬁrst line of the right-hand side of (46). Let r 2 (1+
h
Dpi;1)
56if Dpi < ¡2h, and let r = 1
2 otherwise. Note that
å
KT
































































































Substituting these and using lk(Ik¡1




























Since (1¡r)KDpi+Kh > 0 and limT!¥
lk(Ik¡1
¡i ;l)
T ¸ 0, the right-hand side is positive.
Therefore, å
KT
t=[rKT]D2(t) > 0 for sufﬁciently large T. This, together with Lemma 12,
completes the proof. Q.E.D.
57Lemma 18. limT!¥D2(1) = ¡¥.
Proof. Lemma 7 of Yamamoto (2007) asserts that F1(KT ¡1) = o(T¡1) as T ! ¥.
On the other hand, lk(Ik¡1
¡i ;l) = O(T) as T ! ¥. Hence, the term in the last line
of the right-hand side of (46) and the second term in the third line converge to zero.
Meanwhile, the ﬁrst term in the third line goes to inﬁnity and the limit of the term
in the fourth line is non-negative, since (19) holds and limT!¥
lk(Ik¡1
¡i ;l)
T ¸ 0. Hence,
limT!¥D2(1) = ¡¥. Q.E.D.
Let t be as in Lemma 12, and r be as in Lemma 17. From Lemmas 12, 15, and
17, if T is sufﬁciently large, then the value å
KT
t=t(D1(t)+D2(t)) is positive for all t >
minft;rKTg, and hence Wi(KT) > Wi(t) for all t > minft;rKTg¡1. Also, using
Lemmas 12, 16, and 18, one can show that if T is sufﬁciently large, then the value
å
t
t=1(D1(t)+D2(t)) is negative for all t · minft;rKTg, implying Wi(0) >Wi(t) for
all t < minft;rKTg. Using Vi(h
[k¡1]
¡i ) =Wi(0) =Wi(KT), it follows that Vi(h
[k¡1]
¡i ) >
Wi(t) for all t 2 f1;¢¢¢ ;KT ¡1g, as desired.
So far it has been shown that player i prefers playing a constant action to mixing
two actions. Since a similar argument shows that mixing n actions is better than mixing
n+1 actions, player i is worse off by deviating from a constant action. This completes
the proof.
C.5.3 Proof of Lemma 10
Part 1. Proof of Uniqueness. Notice that (39) is represented by the matrix form
Ql¡1 = b (50)
where l¡1 is a column vector with elements l¡1(x) for all x 2 XB, Q is the coefﬁcient






i¡1 jsx) for x 2 XB and ˜ x 2 XB, and b is























converges to one if ˜ x = x and to zero otherwise, as T ! ¥. This implies that the matrix
Q converges to the identity matrix as T ! ¥. Hence, for sufﬁciently large T, there is
the inverse of Q, and (50) has a unique solution l¡1 = Q¡1b.







¡ijsx) converges to one as
























































































¡i ) > 0
for each x 2 XB. Hence, (40) holds.
Part 3. Proof of (20). From (39), player i’s average payoff in the auxiliary scenario
from sx is wi for all x 2 XB. Therefore, it sufﬁces to show that playing s
xi
i is a best
reply against s
x¡i
¡i . The next lemma shows that deviating to other actions in period
t 2 f(j¡1)T +1;¢¢¢ ; jTg for j , i is not proﬁtable.
Lemma 19. For each j ,i andt 2f(j¡1)T +1;¢¢¢ ; jTg, player i is indifferent among
all actions in period t of the block game regardless of the past history.
Proof. In period t 2 f(j ¡1)T +1;¢¢¢ ; jTg, players attempt to receive the message
from player j through the random events (yl(faG
j g))l,j. Since player i’s action cannot
affect whether these random events are counted, she is indifferent among all actions.
Q.E.D.
It remains to consider deviations in period t 2 f(i¡1)T +1;¢¢¢ ;iTg. As shown in
the following lemma, player i is indifferent between aB
i and ai ,aG
i ;aB
i in these periods.
Lemma 20. For each t 2 f(i¡1)T +1;¢¢¢ ;iTg and ai 2 Ai nfaG
i ;aB
i g, player i is
indifferent between ai and aB
i in period t of the block game independently of the past
history.
Proof. In period t 2 f(i¡1)T +1;¢¢¢ ;iTg, player j attempts to receive a message
from player i through yj(faG
i g), and both ai 2 Ai nfaG
i ;aB
i g and aB
i induce the same
distribution of yj(faG
i g). Q.E.D.
Thus it sufﬁces to show that mixing aG
i and aB
i in the T-period interval from period
(i¡1)T +1 to period iT is not proﬁtable. For each x¡i 2 XB
¡i and t 2 f0;¢¢¢ ;Tg, let
59Wi(s
x¡i
¡i ;t) denote player i’s (unnormalized) payoff in the auxiliary scenario against s
x¡i
¡i
when player i follow a sequence
(aB
i ;¢¢¢ ;aB




i |         {z         }
T¡t
)
from period (i¡1)T +1 to period iT, and chooses a best reply in other periods. That
is, Wi(s
x¡i
¡i ;t) is deﬁned as
Wi(s
x¡i












































Lemma 21. When d = 1, there is T > 0 such that for all T > T, x¡i 2 XB








Proof. See Appendix C.5.4. Q.E.D.
This lemma asserts that player i is worse off by mixing aG
i and aB
i in the ith T-
period interval of the signaling round (and by taking a best reply in other periods),
when d equals one. By continuity, the result remains true as long as d is close to one.
C.5.4 Proof of Lemma 21













































Without loss of generality, consider a particular x¡i 2 XB
¡i, and let D3(t) denote the
ﬁrst term of the right-hand side and D4(t) the second term.
Lemma 22. For any n ¸ 1, maxt2f1;¢¢¢;TgjD3(t)j = o(T¡n) as T ! ¥.
60Proof. Observe that Vi(h
[0]




























¯ = o(T¡n) (54)
The following claims are useful. The proofs are found in Appendix C.5.5.
Claim 4. For any n ¸ 1, j 2 I, and xj 2 Xj, if player j 2 I sends xj in the signaling
round, then the probability of ˆ xj(ht
l) , xj for some l , j is o(T¡n) as T ! ¥.
Claim 5. For any n¸1, j 2I, and m0
j 2M0
j, if player j 2I sends m0
j in the conﬁrmation
round, then the probability of ˆ m0
j(ht
l) , m0
j for some l , j is o(T¡n) as T ! ¥.
Claim 6. Let P(t) denote the probability that ˆ xi(ht
j) = G and ˆ xi(ht
l) = B for some j , i
and l ,i; j when player i chooses aB
i t times and aG
i T ¡t times during the ith T-period
interval. Then, for any n ¸ 1, maxt2f1;¢¢¢;TgP(t) = o(T¡n) as T ! ¥.
By deﬁnition, if players ¡i make correct inferences on each other’s message in
the signaling round and the conﬁrmation round, and if there is no pair (j;l) such that
ˆ xi(ht
j) = G and ˆ xi(ht




¡i. Thus it follows from Claims 4 through 6




¡i is 1¡o(T¡n) irrespective of player i’s play in the ith
T-period interval. This proves (54). Q.E.D.
Lemma 23. There is T such that for any T > T, there is t such that D4(t) is negative
for all t · t and is positive for all t > t.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Lemma 12. Q.E.D.
Lemma 24. limT!¥D4(1) = ¡¥, and limT!¥D4(T) = ¥.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Lemma 18. Q.E.D.
Lemmas 22 through 24, together with Wi(s
x¡i
¡i ;0) = Wi(s
x¡i




C.5.5 Proofs of Claims
The following two claims are useful to prove other claims.
Claim 7. F1(t;T;r) is single-peaked with respect to t and r. Also, F2(t;T;r) is single-
peaked with respect to t and r. Here, a function h(t) is single-peaked with respect to t
if h(t) ¸ h(t +1) implies h(t +1) ¸ h(t +2).
Proof. Follows from Lemma 5 of Yamamoto (2007). Q.E.D.
61Claim 8. For any r 2 (0;1) satisfying r , q3 and n ¸ 1, F1(0;T ¡1;[r(T ¡1)]) =
o(T¡n) as T ! ¥.
Proof. This is a trivial extension of Lemma 6 of Yamamoto (2007). To get the result,
just replace T2 with Tn. Q.E.D.
Proof of Claim 1. Using Claim 8, one can show that F1([rT]¡1;T ¡1;Z0
T) = o(T¡n)
for any r 2 [q2;1), as in the proof of Lemma 7 of Yamamoto (2007). However, the
proof of Yamamoto (2007) does not work for r 2 [0;q2), since TF1(T ¡1;T ¡1;Z0
T)
may not go to inﬁnity. An alternative proof is as follows.
Let fT(t) = [q2(t +1)]+[q3(T ¡t)]. Since fT(T ¡1) = 0, fT(0) = q3T, and
fT(t)+1 ¸ fT(t ¡1) for all t, and (18) holds, there is a sequence of integers (tT)¥
T=1
such that fT(tT) = Z0
T when T is large enough. By deﬁnition,
[q2(tT +1)]+[q3(T ¡tT)] = Z0
T (55)
















¸ T2F1(0;T ¡1¡tT;[q3(T ¡tT)])F1(tT;tT;Z0
T ¡[q3(T ¡tT)])
= T2F1(0;T ¡1¡tT;[q3(T ¡tT)])F1(tT;tT;[q2(tT +1)])
for sufﬁciently large T. Here, the last equality comes from (55). Observe that F1(0;T;r)
is maximized by r = [q3(T +1)], since F1(0;T;r) ¸ F1(0;T;r¡1) if and only if r ·
q3(T +1). Likewise, F1(T;T;r) is maximized by r = [q2(T +1)]. Therefore, [q3(T ¡
tT)] and [q2(tT +1)] are the maximizers of F1(0;T ¡1¡tT;r) and F1(tT;tT;r), re-
spectively. Thus F1(0;T ¡1¡tT;[q3(T ¡tT)]) ¸ 1
T and F1(tT;tT;[q2(tT +1)]) ¸ 1
T.
Plugging these into the above inequality,
T2F1(tT;T ¡1;Z0




T) = o(T¡n). Noting that (56) and (57) hold, it follows that for sufﬁciently
large T, F1([q2T]¡1;T ¡1;Z0
T) < F1(tT;T ¡1;Z0
T) and [q2T]¡1 < tT. Then, from
Claim 7, F1([rT]¡1;T ¡1;Z0
T) · F1([q2T]¡1;T ¡1;Z0
T) for each r 2 [0;q2). This
establishes that F1([rT]¡1;T ¡1;Z0
T) = o(T¡n), since F1([q2(T ¡1)];T ¡1;Z0
T) =
o(T¡n). The proof of F2(T ¡[rT];T ¡1;Z00
T) = o(T¡n) is analogous. Q.E.D.
62Proof of Claim 2. As shown in the proof of Claim 1, there exists (tT)¥
T=1 such that
F1([rT]¡1;T ¡1;Z0
T) < F1(tT;T ¡1;Z0
T) and tT > [rT]¡1, provided that T is large
enough. Then, it follows from Claim 7 that when T is large enough, F0
1(t ¡1) ·
F0
1([rKT]¡1) for all t < [rKT]. The remaining inequalities follow from a similar
argument. Q.E.D.
Proof of Claim 3. Let rT = [q3(T ¡1¡[rT])]+[q2[rT]]. Then, from (18), rT > Z0
T
for sufﬁciently large T. Also, one can show that T2F1([rT]¡1;T ¡1;rT) ¸ 1 for
sufﬁciently large T. (The proof is omitted, since this follows from a similar reason for
T2F1(tT;T ¡1;Z0
T) ¸ 1 in the proof of Claim 1.) Then, (15) and Claims 7 and 1 give
the desired inequality, F1([rT]¡1;T ¡1;Z00
T)·F1([rT]¡1;T ¡1;Z0
T), for sufﬁciently
large T. A similar argument applies to F2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Claim 4. For each j ,i and l ,i; j, let Pr(ˆ xj(ht
l),Bjxj =B) be the probability
of ˆ xj(ht
l) , B when player j sends xj = B. In what follows, it is shown that Pr(ˆ xj(ht
l) ,





T]) = o(T¡n) (58)








for all r < [
2q2+q3
3 T]. If F1(0;T;r) · F1(0;T;[
2q2+q3







3 T])=o(T¡n), but the law of large
numbers and Lemma 3 assures that limT!¥år<[
2q2+q3
3 T]F1(0;T;r)=1; a contradiction.
Therefore, F1(0;T;r) · F1(0;T;[
2q2+q3
3 T]) for all r > [
2q2+q3
3 T]. This, together with
(58), shows that
Pr(ˆ xj(ht









3 T]) = o(T¡n):
A similar argument applies to xj = G. Q.E.D.
Proof of Claim 5. Analogous to the proof of Claim 4. Q.E.D.
Proof of Claim 6. Let Pr(ˆ xi(ht
j) = Gjt) be the probability of ˆ xi(ht
j) = G when player i
chooses aB
i t times and aG
i T ¡t times. Also, let Pr(ˆ xi(ht
l) = Bjt) denote the proba-
bility of ˆ xi(ht
l) = B. It sufﬁces to show that maxt¸[1
2T]Pr(ˆ xi(ht
j) = Gjt) = o(T¡n) and
maxt·[1
2T]Pr(ˆ xi(ht
l) = Bjt) = o(T¡n).
As in the proof of Claim 1, one can show that F1([1
2T];T;[
q2+2q3
3 T]) = o(T¡n), and
that there exists a sequence of integers (tT)¥




3 T]) < F1(tT;T;[
q2+2q3
3 T]) and tT < [1
2T]. Then, it follows from
Claim 7 that F1([1
2T];T;[
q2+2q3
3 T]) ¸ F1(t;T;[
q2+2q3
3 T]) for all t ¸ [1
2T], provided
that T is large enough. Meanwhile, as in the proof of Claim 1, one can show that
T2F1(t;T;[q2(t +1)]+[q3(T ¡t +1)]) ¸ 1 for each t ¸ [1




3 T]) ¸ F1(t;T;[
q2+2q3
3 T]) ¸ F1(t;T;r)
for all t ¸ [1
2T] and r > [
q2+2q3

















3 T]) = o(T¡n)





l) = Bjt) = o(T¡n)
for all n ¸ 1. Q.E.D.
Appendix D: Proof of Lemma 5
Let ui : Ai¡1£Wi¡1 ! R and ui be as in the proof of Lemma 4. Without loss of gener-
ality, consider a particular i 2 I. To simplify the notation, let XG be the set of all x 2 X
satisfying xi¡1 = G, and XG
¡i be the set of all x¡i 2 X¡i satisfying xi¡1 = G. Let H
[0]
¡i be
a union of H
[0]
¡i(x) over all x 2 XG (see the proof of Lemma 4 for the speciﬁcation of
H
[0]
¡i(x)). Also, for each k 2 f1;¢¢¢ ;K¡1g, let H
[k]












i is decomposable into real-valued functions (q¡1;¢¢¢ ;qK+1) as in
the proof of Lemma 4. In what follows, the transfers (q¡1;¢¢¢ ;qK+1) are speciﬁed so
that (23) through (25) hold.
Let q0 and qK+1 be as in the proof of Lemma 4, i.e., these transfers are the dis-
counted sums of ui. Then, player i is indifferent among all actions in periods of the
conﬁrmation round and the report round.
The transfers (q1;¢¢¢ ;qK) are speciﬁed by backward induction. To deﬁne qk, as-
sume that the transfers (qk+1;¢¢¢ ;qK+1) are determined so that player i’s continuation




¡i, augmented by (qk+1;¢¢¢ ;qK+1), is equal toVi(h
[k]
¡i), and
that (23) holds for all l ¸ 1+6N +k(1+2N), htl 2 Htl, and x 2 XG. Here, for each




¡i, the value Vi(h
[k]
¡i) denotes the minimum of player i’s
continuation payoff after history h
[k]
¡i over all her continuation strategies consistent with
64S
Tb
i (i.e., continuation strategies that play some ai 2 A k constantly in the kth main
round for each k) subject to the constraints that monitoring is perfect and that payoffs














¡i and over all her continuation strategies consistent with S
Tb
i , subject to
the constraints that monitoring is perfect and that payoffs in the communication stages




¡i, the value Vi(h
[k]
¡i) de-
notes player i’s continuation payoff when she earns mina2Api(a) in periods of the main
rounds and zero in the other periods.





¡i is equal toVi(h
[k¡1]
¡i ), and such that (23) holds for all l ¸ 1+6N+
(k¡1)(1+2N), htl 2 Htl, and x 2 XG. Notice that the transfers (q1;¢¢¢ ;qK) can be
speciﬁed by iterating this argument, as in the proof of Lemma 4.
Suppose that qk is decomposed as in (33). Then, on the analogy of Lemma 8, (23)
holds for all l ¸ 2+6N+(k¡1)(1+2N).





¡i and ai 2 Ai, let ˜ Wi(h
[k¡1]
¡i ;ai) denote player i’s continuation payoff from
the kth main round, augmented by (qk+1;¢¢¢ ;qK+1) and by the second term of (33),
when player i plays ai constantly in the kth main round and plays a best reply thereafter.
As in the proof of Lemma 4, one can write ˜ Wi(Jk¡1



































¡i and l 2 f1;¢¢¢ ;jA k
i jg, let 1[Jk¡1
¡i ;l] : H
[k;m]
i¡1 ! f0;1g be the indicator func-
tion such that 1[Jk¡1
¡i ;l](h
[k;m]













i¡1 ) = 0 otherwise. For each ai 2 Ai, let 1ai : H
[k;m]
i¡1 ! f0;1g be the indicator
function such that 1ai(h
[k;m]
i¡1 ) = 1 if and only if the random event yi¡1(faig) is counted
more than ZKT times in the kth main round (according to history h
[k;m]
i¡1 ).




















for all x¡i 2 XG


























































¡i and ai 2 A k
i . Note that the right-hand side of (59) denotes
player i’s continuation payoff after h
[k¡1]
¡i , augmented by (qk;¢¢¢ ;qK+1), when player i
chooses ai 2 A k
i constantly in the kth main round and plays a best reply thereafter. The
next lemma assures that the above qk satisﬁes the desired property.
Lemma 25. There is T such that for all T > T, there is d 2 (0;1) such that for all












¡i . Also, under this transfer scheme, (23) holds for all l ¸ 1+6N +








Proof. Analogous to the proof of Lemma 9. Q.E.D.
Let q¡1 be such that
q¡1(h
[¡1]



































i¡1) is player (i¡1)’s private history in the tth period of the block game, and































66for all x¡i 2XG
¡i. Note that the right-hand side of (60) denotes player i’s auxiliary payoff
from the block strategy proﬁle sx.
Lemma 26. There is T such that for all T > T, there is d 2 (0;1) such that for all










i¡1 . Also, under this transfer scheme, (23) and (24) hold for all l ¸ 0,
htl 2 Htl, and x 2 XG.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Lemma 10. Q.E.D.
This lemma asserts that the speciﬁed UG
i satisﬁes (23) and (24). Finally, (25) fol-
lows as in the proof of Lemma 4.
Appendix E: Proof of Proposition 3
In this appendix, we prove Proposition 3. Let A 2 J be such that Ai = fa¤
i ;a¤¤
i g
for each i 2 I. Then by assumption, one can check that vi(A ) · maxai2Aipi(ai;a¤¤
¡i) <
pi(a¤) · vi(A ). Let p 2 4J be such that p(A ) = 1 and p( ˜ A ) = 0 for ˜ A , A . Then
by deﬁnition, p(a¤) 2 V(p). Also, p(a¤) 2 £i2I[p¢vi;p¢vi], since vi(A ) < pi(a¤) ·
vi(A ). Therefore, p(a¤) is an element of the right-hand side of (2).
It remains to check that the stage game corresponds to the positive case. Let ˜ p 2
4J be such that ˜ p(A ) = 1¡e, ˜ p(A) = e, and ˜ p( ˜ A ) = 0 for other ˜ A , where e > 0.
It sufﬁces to show that for a sufﬁciently small e > 0, the intersection of V( ˜ p) and
£i2I[ ˜ p¢vi; ˜ p¢vi] is N-dimensional.
Since vi(A ) < pi(a¤) · vi(A ) and pi(a¤¤) < pi(a¤) for all i 2 I, there is a payoff
vector v such that v is a convex combination of p(a¤¤) and p(a¤) and p¢vi < vi < p¢vi
for all i 2 I. By deﬁnition, this payoff vector v is in the feasible payoff set, and is
an element of V(p). Therefore, v is an element of V( ˜ p). Also, since ˜ p¢vi and ˜ p¢vi
converge to p¢vi and p¢vi as e ! 0, v is an interior point of £i2I[ ˜ p¢vi; ˜ p¢vi] for a
sufﬁciently small e. Fix such a e.
Recall that the feasible payoff set is full dimensional, and so is the set V( ˜ p). Let
˜ v be an interior point of V( ˜ p), and let ˆ v = kv+(1¡k)˜ v for k 2 (0;1). Since v is an
element of V( ˜ p) and ˜ v is an interior point of V( ˜ p), ˆ v is an interior point of V( ˜ p). In
addition, ˆ v is an interior point £i2I[ ˜ p¢vi; ˜ p¢vi] for k sufﬁciently close to one, since v is
an interior point of £i2I[ ˜ p¢vi; ˜ p¢vi]. These facts show that ˆ v is an interior point of the
intersection of V( ˜ p) and £i2I[ ˜ p¢vi; ˜ p¢vi]. Hence, this intersection is N-dimensional.
67Appendix F: Characterizing E(d) for the Abnormal Case
Theorem 1 characterizes the limit set of belief-free review-strategy equilibrium payoffs
for the positive, negative, and empty cases, but it does not apply to the abnormal case.
In this appendix, we show that in the abnormal case, the equilibrium payoff set is either
empty or the convex hull of the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium payoffs of the
stage game, for generic payoff functions.
Givenastagegame, letJ ¤ bethemaximalsetJ 0 µJ suchthatthereis p24J
such that
(i) p(A ) = 0 for all A < J 0;
(ii) pvi ¸ pvi for all i 2 I;
(iii) pi(a)¸pi(˜ ai;a¡i) for all i2I satisfying pvi = pvi, for all A 2J 0, for all a2A ,
and for all ˜ ai 2 Ai with equality if ˜ ai 2 Ai; and
(iv) pi(a) = pi(˜ a) for all i 2 I satisfying pvi = pvi, for all A 2 J 0, for all a 2 A ,
and for all ˜ a 2 A .
Notice that, if J 0 µ J and J 00 µ J satisfy the above conditions, then does the
union of J 0 and J 00. Therefore, the maximal set indeed exists. With an abuse
of notation, for each p 2 4J ¤, let pvi denote åA 2J ¤ p(A )vi(A ) and pvi denote
åA 2J ¤ p(A )vi(A ). Likewise, let V(p) denote the set of feasible payoffs when the
public randomization p 2 4J ¤ determines the recommended action set A .
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium payoff set for the abnormal
case with generic payoff functions.
Proposition 6. Suppose that the stage game is abnormal. If J ¤ is empty, then E(d) =
/ 0 for every d 2 (0;1). If J ¤ is not empty and if pi(a) , pi(˜ a) for all i 2 I, a 2 A, and
˜ a , a, then limd!1E(d) is equal to the convex hull of the set of pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium payoffs of the stage game.
To prove this proposition, the following lemma is useful.





for any d 2 (0;1). If J ¤ is empty, then E(d) = / 0 for any d 2 (0;1).
68Proof. Suppose that there is a belief-free review-strategy equilibrium s 2 S. As in the
proof of Proposition 1, player i’s continuation payoff from the lth review phase is in
the interval [plvi;plvi], where pl is as in (30) and A (l) is the union of the support of
s(htl¡1) over all htl¡1 2 Htl¡1. In particular, together with the feasibility constraint, the
equilibrium payoff vector is in the setV(p1)
T
£i2I[p1vi;p1vi]. Thus, it sufﬁces to show
that J ¤¤ µ J ¤, where J ¤¤ denotes the support of p1.
Let I¤ be the set of all i 2 I such that plvi = plvi for all l ¸ 1. Suppose ﬁrst that
I = I¤. Set p = p1. This p satisﬁes both (i) and (ii) for J 0 = J ¤¤, as J ¤¤ is the
support of p and the equilibrium payoff of player i is in the interval [pvi;pvi]. Also,
since no dynamic incentive is provided in this equilibrium, any a 2 A (l) must be a
Nash equilibrium. This shows that (iii) holds for J 0 = J ¤¤.
Moreover, since plvi = plvi for all i 2 I and l ¸ 1, vi(A (l)) = vi(A (l)) for all
i 2 I and l ¸ 1. This, together with (iii), proves that p satisﬁes (iv) for J 0 = J ¤¤.
To see this, suppose not so that there is A 2 J ¤¤ such that pi(a) < pi(˜ a) for some
a 2 A and ˜ a 2 A . Then from (iii), vi(A ) · maxa0
i2Aipi(a0
i;a¡i) = pi(a) < pi(˜ a) =
mina00
i 2Aipi(a00
i ;a¡i) · vi(A ). But this implies that there is l ¸ 1 such that vi(A (l)) <
vi(A (l)), a contradiction.
Overall, this p satisﬁes (i) through (iv) for J 0 = J ¤¤. Since J ¤ is the maximal
set, J ¤¤ µ J ¤, as desired.
Next, suppose that I , I¤. By deﬁnition, for each i < I¤, there is a natural number li
satisfying plivi < plivi. Let p = 1
jIj¡jI¤j åi<I¤ pli. This p satisﬁes (i) for J 0 = J ¤¤, as
the support of pl is a subset of the support of p1 for all l ¸ 1. Also, (ii) follows, since
player i’s continuation payoff from the lth review phase is in the interval [plvi;plvi] for
all l ¸ 1. Moreover, (iii) and (iv) hold as in the case of I = I¤, since pvi = pvi for all
i 2 I¤, and plvi = plvi for all i 2 I¤ and l ¸ 1. This proves that J ¤¤ µ J ¤. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6. Lemma 27 asserts that if J ¤ is empty, then E(d) = / 0. What
remains is to show that limd!1E(d) is equal to the convex hull of the set of pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium payoffs when J ¤ is not empty. To do so, it sufﬁces to verify
that the right-hand side of (61) is included in the convex hull of the set of pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium payoffs, as the reverse side is obvious.
Since this is the abnormal case, for each p 2 4J satisfying pvi ¸ pvi for all i 2 I,
there is i 2 I such that pvi = pvi. Then, by deﬁnition of J ¤, there is i 2 I such that
pi(a) = pi(˜ a) for all A 2 J ¤, a 2 A , and ˜ a 2 A . This implies that each A 2 J ¤ is
a singleton, since pi(a) , pi(˜ a) whenever ˜ a , a.
Notice that if A is a singleton, then vi(A ) ¸ vi(A ) for all i 2 I. This shows that
pvi ¸ pvi for all p 2 4J ¤ and i 2 I, and then by deﬁnition of J ¤, pi(a) ¸ pi(˜ ai;a¡i)
for all i 2 I, A 2 J ¤, a 2 A , and ˜ ai 2 Ai. This establishes that for each A 2 J ¤
and a 2 A , a is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and pi(a(A )) = vi(A ) = vi(A ) for
69all i 2 I. Therefore, for any A 2 J ¤, the set £i2I[vi(A );vi(A )] is equal to the set of
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium payoffs, as desired. Q.E.D.
Appendix G: Relaxing Conditional Independence
In Remark 1, we argued that (CI) is stronger than necessary for Theorem 1, and can
be replaced with a weaker condition. In this appendix, we assume that the monitoring
structure is weakly conditionally independent in the sense that players observe statisti-
cally independent signals conditional on an action proﬁle a and on a hidden common
shock w0, and show that Theorem 1 is valid under this assumption. Formally, we as-
sume the following:
Condition Weak-CI. There is a ﬁnite set W0, q0 : A ! 4W0, and qi : A£W0 ! 4Wi
for each i 2 I satisfying the following properties.






(ii0) For each i 2 I and ai 2 Ai, rankQi(ai) = jA¡ij£jW0j where Qi(ai) is a matrix
with rows (qi(wijai;a¡i;w0))wi2Wi for all a¡i 2 A¡i and w0 2 W0.
In words, clause (i) says that given an action proﬁle a, a common shock w0 is ran-
domly chosen following the distribution q0(¢ja), and then players observe statistically
independent signals conditional on (a;w0). Clause (ii) is a version of individual full-
rank condition.
Under (Weak-CI), players’ signals are correlated through a common shock w0, so
that a player’s signal has some information about the opponents’ signals. But we can
construct random events such that a player’s private signal has no information about
whether the opponents’ random events are counted, and thus no feedback on what the
opponents will do in a continuation play. Therefore, a player has no incentive to play a
history-dependent strategy within a review phase and hence the equilibrium construc-
tion in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 are valid under (Weak-CI).
Speciﬁcally, we can show the following lemmas under (Weak-CI). Let P(yija;w¡i)
denote the probability that the random event yi is counted when the action proﬁle a is
played and players ¡i observe w¡i. The proofs of the lemmas are similar to Lemma 1
of Yamamoto (2007), and hence omitted.
Lemma 28. Suppose that there are only two players and that (Weak-CI) holds. Then,
for some q1 and q2 satisfying 0 < q1 < q2 < 1, there is a random event yi(A¡i) :
70Ai£Wi ! [0;1] for all i 2 I and A¡i 2 J¡i such that for all a 2 A and w¡i 2 W¡i,
P(yi(A¡i)ja) =
(




Lemma 29. Suppose that there are three or more players and that (Weak-CI) holds.
Then, for some q1, q2, and q3 satisfying 0 < q1 < q2 < q3 < 1, there are random events
yi(Aj) : Ai £Wi ! [0;1] and yi(ai+1;ai¡1) : Ai £Wi ! [0;1] for all i, j, a 2 A, and
Aj 2 Jj such that for all ˜ a 2 A and w¡i 2 W¡i,
P(yi(Aj)j˜ a) =
(







q1 if ai¡1 = ˜ ai¡1 and ai+1 , ˜ ai+1
q3 if ai+1 = ˜ ai+1 and ai¡1 , ˜ ai¡1
q2 otherwise
;
P(yi(Aj)j˜ a) = P(yi(Aj)j˜ a;w¡i);
P(yi(ai+1;ai¡1)j˜ a) = P(yi(ai+1;ai¡1)j˜ a;w¡i);
and for each i and j , i, player i’s random event and player j’s random event are
statistically independent conditional on any a 2 A.
Note that P(yija;w¡i) = P(yija) means that players ¡i’s signal w¡i has no in-
formation about whether the random event y is counted, and hence players have no
incentive to use a history-dependent strategy within a review phase. This shows that
Theorem 1 remains valid even if (CI) is replaced with (Weak-CI).
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